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


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

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# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

*A quarterly journal of philosophy*

*Volume XXXIII, Number 3* MARCH 1956

THE STARTING POINT IN SCOTTISH COMMON-SENSE REALISM
*Walter P. Krolikowski*, S.J.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL ESSENCES ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
*Ralph B. Gehring*, S.J.

Notes on Foreign Books

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THE MODERN

# SCHOOLMAN

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Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J.

# THE STARTING POINT IN SCOTTISH COMMON-SENSE REALISM

*Mr. Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., received his M.A. from Saint Louis University. He taught at the University of Detroit High School. He is now engaged in theological studies at West Baden College (Indiana).*

One of the duties of a philosopher seeking to establish a genuinely realistic philosophy is to examine the failures of realistic philosophers of the past. For the fact is that many of these philosophers have failed to make good their claims. Their failures must be accounted for and the pitfalls they encountered must be avoided if the quest for a realistic philosophy is to be fully successful.

Of the many modern attempts to establish a realistic philosophy one of the most famous is that of Scottish common-sense realism. It had a long and honorable history both in Europe and America. In Europe its history extended a century from the Aberdeen group's first publication by George Campbell in 1763. Arising as a protest against Hume's skepticism, it combatted that theory before succumbing itself to the latter-day attacks of the Darwinists and the German idealists. In America its life line extended from John Witherspoon's accession to the presidential chair at Princeton in 1768 to the death of James McCosh, a later president of Princeton, in 1895. Though it was by no means the only philosophy taught in America, it has been called the accepted philosophy taught in Protestant colleges, particularly at Princeton, the academic stronghold of Presbyterianism.[1] Scottish realism came to be looked upon by its proponents as *the* American philosophy.[2] In spite of its privileged position, in spite of the fact that it was welcomed by those interested in having a philosophy compatible with Christian orthodoxy, by 1839 its position as *the* American philosophy began to be challenged, first by the transcendentalists, later by the evolutionists, idealists, and pragmatists.

Why did Scottish realism succumb? Two approaches could be used to explain this phenomenon: first, a description of the attack from without by the Darwinists and idealists in Scotland and England, by the transcendentalists, evolutionists, idealists, and pragmatists in America; second, a description of the inner weaknesses which made it an easy prey to its opponents. It is with this second approach, a description of its inner weakness, that this article will be concerned. And because Scottish realism in its most typical and purest form is found in the writings of Thomas Reid (1710-96), this article will be largely devoted to an exposition of his views.

## The Starting Point

Now, the philosopher's starting point is crucial in any philosophy. If the foundation of the philosophy is hastily, thoughtlessly chosen, the philosophic structure erected on it will be as weak as the foundation is. If the foundation is not firmly established, what follows on it may not square with reality. If the starting point is taken over from another man, all will depend on whether the use the philosopher intends to make of it fits the use for which the foundation was laid and on how well the predecessor has laid it.

A starting point for the philosopher is not, therefore, an easy thing to choose. Nor is it a simple thing. It may, and usually does, involve three factors. A starting point will be, in some sense, experiential—a thought, a thing caught in motion, an existent challenging the philosopher to plumb its depths. However, other men have experienced the same thing this philosopher has, but they have failed, to his satisfaction, to account for it. As a result, the starting point may also be polemical. Lastly, since the experiential starting point is of a certain kind, and since predecessors have chosen an incorrect or less fruitful

[1]Cf. Harvey Gates Townsend, *Philosophical Ideas in the United States* (New York: American Book Co., 1934), pp. 102-8.

[2]James McCosh, "What an American Philosophy Should Be," in *Realistic Philosophy* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1890), I, 1-4.

[3]Cf. Sir Isaac Newton, *Opticks* (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), pp. 401-2; 404-5. See also James Collins, *A History of Modern European Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1954), pp. 86-96.

[4]*The Works of Thomas Reid*, ed. by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart, and Co., 1846), p. 97. Cf. also p. 527. Hereafter this collection of Reid's writings will be cited in the footnotes as *Works*.

starting point or have failed to respect the nature of that experiential starting point, the starting point to some extent will be methodological; that is, the philosopher at the very start will choose the method or procedure he will employ to handle the materials he has chosen in his quest for a fully established philosophy.

We shall find all three factors—experiential, polemical, and methodological—operative in the starting point of the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid.

### The Methodological Starting Point

Reid began by adopting the methodological procedure which Newton outlines at the end of his *Opticks*. The order which Newton followed in his investigation proceeds in three steps: phenomena of motions are observed and experimented with; these phenomena are analyzed into the forces of nature; these forces of nature, in turn, function as principles, "demonstrating" or explaining other phenomena which may be said to proceed from, or be made up of, these forces of nature. Another way of describing this procedure is in terms of an analysis of a complex phenomenon into its simple factors and of a synthesis or composition of these factors into other new complex phenomena.[3]

Such is the procedure Reid adopted. There were various reasons for this adoption. The Newtonian method had had great success in explaining the material system of the universe. It was logically cohesive. And, most compelling of all reasons, it seemed to Reid to be the only possible method, because it was the only one then in good repute. To such a man as Reid, possibly suffering from a normal case of historical foreshortening, it seemed to be a method founded on man's nature. In short, it was the only possible method, not only because it was enjoying current favor and was logically cohesive, but because it was the only method that fully took into account man's peculiar nature.[4]

Still, Reid's adoption of this method was not without its original nuances. He was moving in a domain in which Newton had neither conceived nor used his method. Transposition demands adaptation.

Newton's method schematically is:

1. Observation of, and experimentation with, certain rigidly selected factors in a complex phenomenon
2. Breakdown into the simple factors of that phenomenon which are amenable to mathematical description
3. Explanation and prediction of other phenomena in which these factors or forces are operative as "causes"

Reid's adaptation of this method comes to this:

1. Observation of certain mental phenomena
2. An ascesis of the prejudices of education, fashion, and philosophy which would hinder accurate observation
3. An analysis of these mental phenomena into the "simple and original principles of his [man's] constitution"
4. A reconstruction of the original mental phenomena with which he began
5. The further use of these now well-established phenomena as the basis on which the philosopher can demonstrate the various phenomena of human nature[5]

Two things must be noted here. Reid's adaptation of Newton's methodological procedure has radically changed the method. Newton would move from rigidly selected observations of physical occurrences (those which can be mathematically described) to their "causes" and thence from these "causes" to further predictable "effects." Like Newton, Reid would proceed from a preliminary complex observation to its component parts. The preliminary observation, however, is not scientifically grounded until it has been rebuilt into a scientifically ordered and explicitated whole.[6] Both Reid's emphasis on arriving at the "simples" and on the need for an ascesis of the mind, overlaid as it is with prejudices, seems to point rather to a Baconian approach, which is what the Newtonian method resolves itself into once the mathematical elements are extracted.[7]

Secondly, were there any possible dangers for Reid in accepting the Newtonian method unquestioningly? From Newton's own account there were possible pitfalls. Newton, strictly speaking, was working

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 99.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 418-19.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[8] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 99-103.
[9] McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1890), pp. 208-9.

with functional correlates, not with effects and causes. The "cause" postulated need not be real; neither need it be known. Some cause must be real—not necessarily the cause postulated. The goal of analysis is to reach mechanical causes, not physical causes; for the latter are by nature hypothetical, occult, and beyond the grasp of any inductive process. Such a procedure cannot be satisfactory for a philosophy which purports to be realistic. It is true that in Reid's time there was no question of dealing with mathematicized constructs in mental philosophy, but there was the danger of establishing correlates which are in no sense causally connected. There was the danger of establishing a philosophy of reality in which causes are either unknown or inoperative. And so it turned out. Instead of clearing the road of obstacles to a philosophic investigation, the Newtonian method became for Reid an added obstacle.

### The Polemical Starting Point

In the introduction to *Inquiry into the Human Mind,* Reid points out the men who have brought philosophy under the spell of skepticism, the men whose incantations he will attempt to break. They are Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.[8] Their principal error has been to suppose that there are ideas and that these ideas act as media between the external thing and the knowing person. As a consequence, any knowledge of the external object must be arrived at by a process of reasoning.[9] This, in turn, implies that there are no first or immediate principles.

It is this last implication that Reid wishes to attack. But to attack it, he feels he must attack all—the reality and mediacy of ideas, knowledge of an external object through a process of reasoning, the denial of first principles. This was Reid's choice, and he stands or falls on his decision.

Are his position and that of his adversaries the only two possible? That is, is there a necessary connection among these three points? Reid's own reading of Aristotle should have made him cautious. Aristotle devotes the first chapters of the *Posterior Analytics* to the task of establishing the necessity and fact of some first, immediately known

principles. Reid briefly comments on these passages in *A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*.[10] But Reid must also have realized that Aristotle held firmly to the mental reality of ideas (if not precisely ideas in Locke's sense of the term). A third position, mediate between the position Reid attacked and the one he adopted, remains then a possibility. If Reid's position is to be solidly grounded, this third position must be accounted for. Reid failed to make such an accounting.

Furthermore, the Newtonian method is no magic guarantee of Reid's ultimate victory over his adversaries. At least Hume applied Newton's laws of reasoning and method to the same phenomena Reid would handle, and in as thoroughgoing a fashion as Reid, and yet remained an adversary.[11]

### The Experiential Starting Point

How, then, does Reid begin? The experience he selects is of little importance; any one of a number will do. What is important is that he should eliminate any possibility of allowing his nonphilosophic prejudices to creep in and influence his case for a realistic philosophy.

With this in mind, Reid begins:

> It is so difficult to unravel the operations of the human understanding, and to reduce them to their first principles, that we cannot expect to succeed in the attempt, but by beginning with the simplest and proceeding by very cautious steps to the more complex.[12]

The simplest operation of human understanding is sensation. What is observed in an act of sensation—more specifically, in an act of smelling, the simplest of sensations? There is "a simple and original affection or feeling of the mind, altogether inexplicable and unaccountable."[13] It is well to remember that for Reid sensation of itself makes no reference to anything outside the sensing man. This act is accompanied by another simple act of the mind, the belief that the sensation really exists here and now in the mind. (Much the same explanation is given of memory, except that this act is accompanied by a belief that what we remember did really exist as a sensation in the past.) Furthermore, an act of sensation suggests the notion of a mind and the belief

[10] *Works*, p. 705.
[11] Cf. Collins, *Modern European Philosophy*, pp. 408-10.
[12] *Works*, p. 104.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[14] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 111; McCosh, *Scottish Phil.*, p. 211.
[15] *Works*, p. 310.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

of its existence and its relation as permanent substrate for sensations. Lastly, since a sensation begins and ends, it suggests the notion of a cause and the belief in that cause's existence.[14]

Such a beginning gets Reid only thus far: there is a sensation, really existing in a real sentient; there is a cause of the sensation really existing. Any idealist could go as far as this without forsaking his position, since the idealist acknowledges or can acknowledge the reality of sensations. Once we have seen what Reid means by a cause, we might say an idealist could go further.

But before attempting to pinpoint the meaning of *cause* in this context, let us see how Reid differentiates sensation from perception.

> When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The agreeable odour I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object, is merely a sensation. It affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without a thought of the rose, or any other object. . . . Perception has always an external object; and the object of my perception, in this case, is that quality in the rose which I discern by the sense of smell. Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the rose, which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of my mind by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality, is what in this case I call perception.[15]

The implications of this passage are, I think, clear. The operation of itself is not simple. Only by analysis can it be broken down to its component parts (and we shall see later that even this description of its component parts is by no means complete). The various factors—sensation, perception, and beliefs—are all concomitant, associated with one another temporally. There is not necessarily any causal relation between them. The sensation is associated with the rose as its (what shall we say?) cause, occasion, or antecedent most closely and powerfully because mind and the physical organs are associated with *all* smells. *This* smell is connected only with the rose.[16] Furthermore, it is not precisely the rose that is cognitively contacted but simply a

quality in the rose. Only by a further nondiscursive process is the rose inferred. Since this whole process is predemonstrative, we must understand that Reid is taking the word *conclude* in a loose sense.[17]

That this explanation must not be understood within any realistic theory of cause and effect becomes clearer if we consider Reid's explanation of these concomitants in terms of signs and things signified. The discussion arises concretely in the section on touch.

We seldom if ever consider the sensation, in the Reidian sense, of hardness. Why is this? The mind, using that sensation as a sign, passes immediately to that quality of hardness in the external object. Now there can be no possible resemblance between the sensation and the quality in the external object, any more than there can be any resemblance between pain and the tip of a sword. How can we account for that sensation and its concomitant act of perception? Reid says:

> . . . by an original principle of our constitution, a certain sensation of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness and creates the belief of it: or, in other words, that this sensation is a natural sign of hardness.[18]

Reid then moves into his formal exposition of a theory of signs. Some signs are artificial, products of habit and custom, like words. Others are natural. In either case, there is no similitude between the sign and the thing signified. In the realm of philosophy, which is for Reid the demonstrative or last step and corresponds with the synthetic moment of Newton, the connection with the thing signified is established by nature but is discovered only by experience. These are not cause/effect relationships but sign/things-signified correlations. In a second realm (what Reid calls—too narrowly for his own examples—the realm of taste and the fine arts) the connection of sign and thing signified is discovered to us by a natural principle. This process involves no reasoning or experience. Examples would be the way an

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 425.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 257; cf. also p. 327.
[21] In only one case will Reid allow a real knowledge of causality. In ourselves as knowing and willing beings we find immediate knowledge of a causal activity. Since it is directly experienced, it falls outside the Newtonian framework, or, better, is located in the first experiential and preanalytic moment. Any causality imputed to noncognitive, nonvolitional beings is due to our loose human way of conceiving. What we find by a Newtonian analysis is simply connection by circumstance. Cf. *Works*, pp. 522-27.

infant is instinctively frightened or pleased by a grimace or smile, the way we react to a picture or piece of sculpture. In the realm of common sense, the connection of sign and signified is suggested or conjured up, as it were, by a natural kind of magic and at once gives us a conception and creates a belief of it. Sensation, for example, suggests to us the sentient knower. In fact, sensation is the sign of the reality of the knowing subject, of perception, of the reality of the quality in the thing perceived, and of the reality of the thing perceived. Here again there are no cause/effect relationships, but only sign/thing-signified correlations.[19]

Reid is quite explicit on this point. He should, at this crucial point, be allowed to speak for himself:

> It is . . . a law of our nature, that we perceive not external objects, unless certain impressions be made by the object upon the organ, and by means of the organ upon the nerves and brain. But of the nature of those impressions we are perfectly ignorant; and though they are conjoined with perception by the will of our Maker, yet it does not appear that they have any necessary connection with it in their own nature, far less that they can be the proper efficient cause of it. We perceive, because God has given us the power of perceiving, and not because we have impressions from objects. We perceive nothing without those impressions, because our Maker has limited and circumscribed our powers of perception, by such laws of Nature as to his wisdom seemed meet, and such as suited our rank in his creation.[20]

Such a procedure is quite in keeping with his Newtonian method. That it is, besides, a brand of occasionalism can easily be seen. What in effect does Reid have? Simply a theory of connection; things are associated together almost willy-nilly.[21] Being a Newtonian, Reid notes those connections even though he may not or cannot account for them. When he has satisfied himself that he has gone as far as he can in breaking down the complex operation to its "simples" or first principles, the analytic moment is over. Common sense, as he calls this first phase, has done its work in a thoroughly scientific way. Now the grand philosophers who use the discursive reason proper to the

synthetic moment may step in and take over, assured of the validity of their first principles, and construct their grand structures.

Can we be satisfied with this procedure? Let us remember that Newton, grounded in experience at the beginning of this analytic moment, was content to arrive at mechanical laws, which were, in a sense, mathematical surrogates for the powers, real as they were, whose intelligibilities lay hidden from man's purview. These mathematical "simples" Newton never pretended to be real. There is, then, no guarantee that, if we use Newton's method, we shall remain within the realm of the real. This consideration must, of necessity, be crucial for Reid. It will be no guarantee of the existence of a real world that he comes up, without any discursive process, with a "belief" in the real world as one of his simples. In fact, there is here a curious reversal of Newton's procedure. In Newton, the reality of the external world is taken for granted, and the preliminary observations are of events in the real world. The mechanical laws of Newton, however, need not be, and probably never are, real. In Reid, there is no presuming of the reality of the world (nor, he insists, any reasoning to it). It is only by reducing a complex observation to its simple components that Reid proposes to come to a knowledge of the existence of the external object. The existence of the external object comes at the end of the analytic moment, a point at which Newton is quite consciously using constructs. Reid, if he is faithful to his method, can guarantee us no more than the method allows, that the reality of the external object is a construct.

Reid is open to three objections based on his analysis of sensation as a sign. Ideas as media of knowledge he denounces; he fails to notice that signs are media as well. If knowledge is mediated and idealism is the necessary consequence of that mediation, no matter the type of media employed, Reid falls under his own condemnation, whether he will or not.

Secondly, as Hamilton, Reid's editor, remarks in a footnote,[27] Reid's

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[23] *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948-50). I, *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, pp. 227-31; *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, pp. 264-66. II, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, pp. 58-59, 69-70, 88-89. III, *Alciphron*, pp. 149-58, 305-8. See also the illuminating summary of Berkeley's theory of signs by Luce in Vol. I, pp. 152-53.

[24] *Works*, pp. 128-29.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

theory of signs is taken from Berkeley. Berkeley, in his earliest works, *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* and *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, speaks of what a man sees as a mark or sign of something he touches. Only the tangible thing is outside the mind. All signs are arbitrary; that is, they are not like the thing signified; the similarity is rather like the resemblance of a written word to the same word spoken. There are two kinds of arbitrary signs: a word is an artificial sign; things seen are rather natural signs. Furthermore, there is no cause/effect relationship, but rather one of connection. The connection is habitual but not necessary. The connection must be learned, as words are connected with things only by repeated experiences. The same doctrine is repeated in *Alciphron* and widened to include all sensations as signs (thereby denying the external reality of tactile objects as well as visual ones) in the *Principles of Human Knowledge*.[23]

Reid does add a further development by declaring some sign/thing-signified connections are known without repeated experiences, but he fails to answer Berkeley's objections to such a position. Furthermore, by using this analysis, Berkeley arrives at an immaterialistic position. How can Reid avoid arriving at the same terminus? Reid escapes this difficulty only by ignoring it.

Thirdly, since Reid finds no necessary and causal connection between the external-object senses and the object perceived and no similarity between them,[24] and since the knowledge of the external object is gained purely by an activity of the mind,[25] Reid must explain our knowledge of external things only in terms of the mind's nature. Sensation and the activity of the object have no causal status as instruments. They are simply occasions. The mind must, then, know by simple acts of intuition. What does Reid mean by intuition? Only this: We do know; the brute fact is clear. Every possible explanation philosophers have thought of and every explanation Reid can think of is unsatisfactory. The term *intuition* simply labels for Reid this unsatisfactory state of affairs.

This position is not quite the same as an appeal to a veracious God. Reid, at one point, does make such an appeal: "If we are deceived [in our sensations of touch] . . . we are deceived by Him that made us, and there is no remedy."[26] Yet he takes pains to deny this appeal:

> Shall we say, then, that this belief is the inspiration of the Almighty? I think this may be said in a good sense; for I take it to be the immediate effect of our constitution, which is the work of the Almighty. But, if inspiration be understood to imply a persuasion of its coming from God, our belief of the objects of sense is not inspiration; for a man would believe his senses though he had no notion of a Deity. He who is persuaded that he is the workmanship of God, and that it is a part of his constitution to believe his senses, may think that a good reason to confirm his belief. But he had the belief before he could give this or any other reason for it.[27]

Certainty, then, is prior to, and independent of, any appeal to a veracious God. A further point is also introduced in this quotation. Everything that we know is not placed in our mind directly by God. That much is asserted. The heart of the question, How do we know since we know neither through our senses nor through a direct infusion from God? remains unanswered; and that, I believe, means that Reid has failed to place his treatment of human knowledge on a scientific plane. If the philosopher must end by saying, "No other account can be given of the constitution of things, but the will of Him that made them,"[28] it seems that in this very act of humility he has shrugged off the onerous burden of being a philosopher.

### Common Sense

One last task remains in our exposition of Reid's position. The analytic moment completed, there is a reconstruction, on scientific terms, of the original complex act of knowledge. Reid designates this act as a judgment or, more commonly, as common sense.

Since common sense is a matter of judgment,[29] to understand what Reid means by common sense, we must see what his explanation of judgment is. A judgment is the kind of action a judge performs, sifting and weighing evidence and passing sentence in the light of that evidence.[30] Since the crux of this paper is how Reid comes to a knowledge of the external world, his discussion of necessary, nonexistential judgments may be passed by. What we must see is what he means by

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 329.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 260.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 423.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 413.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 415.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 418.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 419.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

judgments of contingent things, which he calls "judgments of nature."

These judgments of nature are grounded upon the evidence of sense, memory, and consciousness.[31] Judgment is the process of analysis and recomposition of a complex sensation.[32] The traditional definition of a judgment comes to be, in his hands, an act of dividing *and* composing. The senses furnish the rude evidence; judgment sifts what is by nature gross and indistinct, and comes to a distinct and scientific appraisal of that evidence.[33] All the concepts involved in that complex act of judging (including the concept of existence)[34] are gotten, therefore, from other powers of the mind.

Now insofar as judgmental knowledge depends on other knowledge, even though there is no reasoning process involved, judgment falls under the same strictures that we have outlined in the previous section on mediate knowledge. There is, besides, an added difficulty. This kind of act of judgment, of its nature, demands experience in discernment, in evaluating materials. The Reidian judgment cannot be a primitive act of the mind. A youth can hardly be a judge; only the mature man can make a sound judgment about the nature, or, more to our point, the existence of a real world external to himself. Is a realistic philosophy possible only for the elders of a community? Must a man wait until middle age to be sure of the existence of a real world external to himself?

Thus it seems that Reid's attempt at a philosophical explanation of how man comes to know the things about him ends in failure. Yet he need not have failed. His primitive conviction that we know the world about us, a conviction which is present in what he describes as a complex and, as yet, unexamined sensation, still stands. His appeal is no simple one to the generality of mankind, though the term *common sense* allows such an interpretation. Knowledge of real, extramental beings is knowledge at once so definite and so certain that he as an individual cannot ignore it. However, in his haste to arrive at the simple factors of experience, he failed to exploit and examine scientifically that initial experience of a reality confronting him and determining him by its very evidentiality. At one point he writes:

I acknowledge that, if we were to rest in those judgments of Nature

> of which we now speak, without building others upon them, they would not entitle us to the denomination of reasonable beings. But yet they ought not to be despised, for they are the foundation upon which the grand superstructure of human knowledge must be raised. And, as in other superstructures the foundation is commonly overlooked, so it has been in this. The more sublime attainments of the human mind have attracted the attention of philosophers, while they have bestowed but a careless glance upon the humble foundation on which the whole fabric rests.[35]

Unfortunate as it is, Reid condemns himself. Here Reid is speaking of the scientific reconstruction at the end of the analytic moment. He, too, has forgotten the humble foundation, put aside that primordial experience of real being involved in the first cognitive contact the knower makes with sensible beings. For there is at the start of his philosophizing an experience of real being. Perhaps, swayed by the prestige of a Newton, he assumed that experience without examining its own peculiar resources, only to plunge into an investigation of simple factors of experience in an effort to bring him to what he already possessed. In the passage to gain what he already had, he lost it. Like the pregnant woman whom Reid uses as an example,[36] he carried philosophy as an embryo in the womb. Unlike that expectant mother, he delivered the child stillborn.

Reid need not have failed, but the fact is he did. For philosophy is not coterminous with an intitial experience, as Reid himself would be the first to admit. Parker says with regard to the American Critical Realists, and Santayana in particular,

> A genuine datum of experience is being indicated here, but mere indication is not philosophy. . . . It is important, indeed necessary, to recognize the intuitive, preanalytic grasp of existence which we have, and to recognize that such existence is implied in all action. But philosophy must do more; it must give some kind of account of this existence and the way in which it is apprehended.[37]

Even in Newton the initial observation and gathering of facts is not philosophy, even if it might be called philosophy in the womb.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 416.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 415.
[37] Francis H. Parker, "Realism, 'New' and 'Critical', Re-appraised," in the *Proceedings of the Realist Society*, 1954, pp. 11, 13.

# THE KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL ESSENCES ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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St. Thomas repeatedly says that the proper object of the human intellect, in its present life, is the essence of a sensibly perceived material thing, *quidditas rei materialis*.[1] He gives the impression that such knowledge is easy of acquisition for two reasons: first, the proper object of a cognitive faculty is known *primo et per se* by such a faculty;[2] second, the human intellect cannot err in the grasp of its proper object.[3]

On the other hand, St. Thomas affirms that the essential principles of things are unknown; that substantial forms, such as those of natural bodies, are hidden; that the mind with difficulty arrives at a perfect knowledge of even those objects whose accidental determinations are perfectly comprehended by the senses, and in a far lesser degree attains to the natures of things of which man's sensible grasp is more limited.[4]

There is, therefore, at least an apparent antimony in the Thomist doctrine of the knowledge of essences. It is an antimony which seemingly escaped the Scholastics immediately after St. Thomas. The nominalists and Scotists in particular accused him of a naïve realism in his grasp of essences. In this they are imitated by most contemporary non-Scholastic philosophers, who ignore half of the Angelic Doctor's statements about the knowledge of material things and are ridiculously convinced that he and all medieval thinkers believed man capable of immediate and exhaustive knowledge of a stone or an ox.

The sixteenth-century Scholastics, including Suarez, rose against the

nominalists and Scotists in St. Thomas's defense. The Scholastics of the twentieth century, smarting under scientific sneers at their philosophy of nature and of cognition, have risen also. These defenders have not always said the same thing, however, either when explaining Aquinas's doctrine of the grasp of essences or when resolving the aforementioned textual contradictions; neither has the charge of naïve realism entirely died within Scholastic ranks. Echoes of it can be heard in the words of A. Hayen: "One could show how St. Thomas, as Aristotle himself, still remains too Platonic, unfaithful to his own genius, in the conception he made for himself of the *simplex apprehensio* . . ."[5] More than echoes ring in the words of J. de Finance:

> St. Thomas, it seems, would not accord even to the knowledge of the soul the propriety he grants—generously—to our knowledge of corporeal natures, for the qualities by means of which we construct concepts of these natures, he thinks we perceive under their proper determinations.[6]

Now if such competent scholars find matter for condemnation in the Thomist grasp of material essences, it is probable that the charge of naïve realism is not without foundation. And if, after the last eighty years of intensive study of St. Thomas, both the interpretations of the Thomist knowledge of essences and the solutions of the textual antinomy still differ, it is also probable that certain elements of solution

[1]Cf., for example, *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 12; *CG*, III, cap. 108, "Amplius nulla"; *In III De An.*, lect. 8 (ed. Pirotta, No. 717); *ST*, I, q. 87, a. 2, ad 3; *Compend. Theol.*, cap. 85.

[2]*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 8; *In de Trin.*, q. 1, a. 3.

[3]*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 12; *CG*, I, cap. 58; *ibid.*, III, cap. 108; *In III De An.*, lect. 11 (Pirotta, No. 762); *In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 11 (ed. Cathala, No. 1907); *ST*, I, q. 58, a. 5.

[4]*In I De An.*, lect. 1 (ed. Pirotta, No. 15); *In II De An.*, lect. 2 (ed. Pirotta, No. 237); *CG*, IV, cap. 1, "Per has." A list of sixteen similar texts is given by M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De ente et essentia" de s. Thomas d'Aquin, texte établi d'après les manuscrits parisiens. "Bibliothèque Thomiste,"* ed. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P. (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1926), p. 40, n. 2. However, the references to *In II Sent.*, d. 37, and to *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 2, should read *In II Sent.*, d. 35, and *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 1. To this list still other texts could be added, of which the following is emphatic enough: "Our cognition is so weak that no philosopher was ever able to investigate perfectly the nature of a single fly; hence we read that one philosopher was thirty years in solitude to learn the nature of a bee" (*In Symbolum Apostolicum Expositio* [Mandonnet, *Opuscula*, IV, opusc. 35]).

[5]*L'Intentionnel dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (Bruxelles, 1942), p. 290.

[6]*Cogito cartésien et réflexion thomiste* (Paris, 1946), p. 111.

[7]It goes without saying that A. Hayen and J. de Finance are not in the class of "budding Scholastics."

have been, if not overlooked, at least given undue emphasis—unless, of course, the antinomy is not apparent, but real.

The present article proposes to re-examine certain aspects of Aquinas's doctrine. It hopes, first, to determine certain points in his conception of the grasp of material things and, secondly, to remove some of the grosser impressions of naïve realism, not only for the benefit of readers outside the *Schola* but especially for any budding Scholastics who may still share their views.[7] These two purposes are not independent, and their realization must go hand in hand.

It will be well to review various recent authors to see their relative agreement and disagreement, and to provide the background of the problem as it exists today.

## I

In 1908 Pierre Rousselot published his brilliant thesis, *L'Intellectualisme de saint Thomas*, in which he particularly attacked the Thomist grasp of material essences. According to St. Thomas, says Rousselot, the concept is a substitute for the pure idea or perfect intellection, proper to angels. In this human substitute, which is a concept of material essences or quiddities, St. Thomas nevertheless imagined he possessed the ideal grasp of things. The proof is his equation of the proper concept and the definition. Define and conceive are identical for him: and the definition releases to the mind the entire intelligibility of a thing, a mental double of the substantial quiddity, possessing the oneness of the real essence. However, the very duality of terms necessary to a definition should have shown St. Thomas that the material essence is not understood as it really is. Duality of terms means duality of ideas and hinders forever the unity of the concept of a material substance, which is to say that its "notes" are not proper; every general idea is necessarily analogical, even of the intellect's proper object. Yet one cannot say St. Thomas contradicted himself except by opposing his certain and profound principles to his secondary and superficial assertions. The naiveté of his expressions inclines one to believe that St. Thomas had not studied deeply the definability of natural substances.

Rousselot also notes that for St. Thomas all knowledge begins in the

senses and that, faithful to this thesis, he never says the intellect knows substances other than through accidents, some of which conduct to the essence, while others fail to reveal it completely. St. Thomas, however, according to his critic, spoke as if this complete revelation were often realized.[8]

*L'Intellectualisme* is cited by many authors, but only one seems to have referred explicitly to its attack upon the unity of the idea of a material essence. J. de Tonquedec wrote:

> I cannot help but find here one of those cases of confusion against which St. Thomas expressly warned his readers: confusion between the *thing conceived* and the mode of conception; between the *material ingredients* of a concept and its *signification*.[9]

The indeterminate character of the concept, according to De Tonquedec, permits it to be completed by articulation with another concept and to form with it the unity of a definition. In the group "rational animal," animal is a datum which is unfinished, incomplete, a logical "potency" capable of being "actuated" in more than one way. "Animal" and "rational" are not integral but mutually determinable parts of the definition, each embracing the whole from a particular point of view.

This reply came rather late—1929—and though it insists upon the unity of the concept of a material essence, which St. Thomas certainly seems to have held, it does not touch upon its propriety, the question in which Rousselot was particularly interested, nor does it explain how the "articulation" of one concept with another is achieved.

Gilson entered the lists in 1919 with *Le Thomisme: Introduction à la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin.*[10] Its chapter on the intellect and rational knowledge examines the operation by which reason apprehends various objects and, in particular, corporeal substances in-

[8]Rousselot's position has been gathered from his third edition, *L'Intellectualisme de saint Thomas* (Paris, 1936), pp. 78-107. The editor of this edition notes that Rousselot's estimate of conceptual knowledge subsequently evolved, quoting a letter of February 5, 1914: "Je n'ai pas refait le chapitre de ma thèse, dont j'ai cessé d'être satisfait . . . j'y exagérais l'irréalisme de la connaissance conceptuelle" (*ibid.*, p. 106, n. 2).

[9]*Les Principes de la philosophie thomiste. La Critique de la connaissance* (Paris, 1929), p. 159, n. 1.

[10]*Le Thomisme: Introduction à la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1945). The more pertinent pages are 298-331 in the fifth edition. A prefatory note assures the reader that the sections interesting this article have not undergone important modification in respect to previous editions.

ferior to itself. It stresses the importance of certain *semina* of knowledge, *prima intelligibilium principia* or first conceptions, both simple and complex, produced by the intellect in contact with the sensible. Gilson does not explain how these *semina,* according to St. Thomas, operate in the acquisition of knowledge of material essences, but goes on to discuss the role of the agent intellect, developing the traditional interpretation of assimilation and the function of the unconscious *species impressa,* which, establishing an identity between the object known and the knowing subject, thereby guarantees the fidelity of the concept to the object in a process whose infallibility is due to its "naturalness."

*Le Thomisme's* exposition of St. Thomas, however, does little to offset the charge of excessive realism. It gives the impression that, a concept once conceived, the intellect is immediately in possession of the material quiddity, without determining in what sense this quiddity is essential, or enlightening the reader on its precise content, in which he is deservedly interested.

When *Xenia Thomistica* commemorated the six-hundredth anniversary of the canonization of the Angelic Doctor, it contained an article entitled *Utrum iuxta S. Thomae Doctrinam Essentiae Rerum Sensibilium Statim in Simplici Apprehensione Percipiantur.* Its author, Joseph Le Rohellec, endeavors to conciliate the texts affirming an infallible grasp of essences on the one hand and their unknowability on the other. These texts are said to refer to two different cognitions. The first, simple apprehension, is confused and indeterminate; the *second,* requiring discourse or reasoning, is distinct and penetrates to the essence. The initial confused cognition is infallible because of its imperfection and indetermination: And from this initial cognition the nominal definition originates "more or less immediately"; but, often, because of the feebleness of our intellect and "the lack of intelligibility in the object," we cannot arrive at perfectly clear and distinct knowledge, at the scientific definition by genus and specific difference. Only in a few cases (not mentioned) does St. Thomas hold that we acquire such a perfect knowledge of the quiddity by other than laborious effort, but in simple apprehension the integral essence of a thing is known *sub ratione entis.* What is more, at the first meeting with *homo,*

one knows him under the most common and general notions, not only of being but also of substance and of living thing.[11]

No account of studies on Thomist cognition can ignore the monumental *Degrees of Knowledge*.[12] Treating the problem of essences, Maritain pays special attention to difficulties encountered in reading St. Thomas on it. The Thomist texts, it seems, usually concern themselves with the general principle that the substantial essences of things and their specific differences are hidden, and that to know them the intellect must employ differences taken from accidents. Other texts, however, can be divided into two groups: "perinoetic" texts, according as empiric accidents leave the essences concealed, and "dianoetic" texts, according as predicamental accidents are an intelligible manifestation of essential differences and lead the mind to their knowledge.

Maritain's technical terms may need further explanation. "Dianoetic" intellection reaches the essence through the sensible but still in itself; it is not a vision of essences, not a cognition starting from within the heart of a material thing, but reaches the essence through signs which manifest it and are its properties in a strict philosophical sense. Through these signs substantial natures are known in their formal constituents. Accidental forms also are known in themselves but through their effects. This dianoetic intellection, however, is not always granted. Except in the world of man and his artifacts, it stops at notes more universal than specific ones. In the world of sensible reality—a world, says Maritain, below the level of the philosophy of nature—man must be content with empiric signs which do not manifest

[11]Joseph Le Rohellec, "Utrum iuxta S. Thomae Doctrinam Essentiae Rerum Sensibilium Statim in Simplici Apprehensione Percipiantur," *Xenia Thomistica I* (Romae, 1925), 285-302. Le Rohellec likewise treats the problem of essences in St. Thomas in his unfinished and posthumously published work, *Problèmes philosophiques* (Paris, 1932), pp. 28-60, which, however, does not differ in doctrine. The article is cited with approval by A. Hufnagel, *Intuition und Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin* (Munster, 1932), p. 283, n. 1. *Problèmes philosophiques* is cited by R. Jolivet, *L'Intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1934), p. 42, n. 1, and by J. Peghaire, *Intellectus et ratio selon s. Thomas* (Paris-Ottawa, 1936), p. 191, n. 1, who finds its pages on the grasp of *quod quid est* to be "excellentes."

[12]J. Maritain, *Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir* (Paris, 1932), pp. 399-407, 410-12.

[13]*Species, verbum. L'Activité intellectuelle élémentaire selón s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1938), pp. 150-54. On pp. 7-9, the author takes exception to the doctrine of John of St. Thomas, of Maritain, and of Yves Simon, on the nature of the cognition of essences.

[14]E. Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris, 1947), pp. 222-23. The first edition appeared in 1939.

essential differences but substitute themselves for them and are known in their place. This latter knowledge, enclosing the essence from without, is peripheral, "perinoetic," for corporeal natures lower than man refuse to deliver up their ultimate determinations.

Quite different is the positing of the problem by Gaston Rabeau, to whom nothing is clearer than the metaphysical pretension of St. Thomas to grasp immediately the intimate nature of corporeal objects.

> A philological exegesis which would attribute different meanings to *quod quid est, quidditas, essentia,* etc., and pretend that we directly attain the intelligible nature engaged in the sensible but that we ignore the abstract intelligible nature, would clash as well with the texts as with the doctrine: it is indeed the essences which are known directly and which are unknown. The solution of the antinomy must be sought . . . in an analysis of the structure of the intelligible form. What the intellect conceives before all else, and what is for it the first known and the most known, is being, into which it resolves all its conceptions . . . We therefore immediately arrive at the essence as transcendental being linked to a phantasm, and able, by means of this phantasm, to make known the essential properties . . . As different effects and different properties orient to the quest of essential differences, we arrive at the knowledge of different quiddities.[13]

Rabeau's work was immediately noticed by Gilson, who, in his *Réalisme thomiste,* attempts just such a philological exegesis as Rabeau decries and with explicit reference to him. When St. Thomas says that essences are known, he is referring to an intellection of the essence such as it is perceptible to us in its operations, its sensible effects, in which sense it is the *quidditas.* When he says the essences are unknown, he always adds something like *innotescunt autem nobis per accidentia propria.* He is then referring to the form, which confers intelligibility on them and which, being purely intelligible, escapes our intuition. Therefore, *per seipsas,* the essences are unknown to us.[14]

One more author may be cited, A.-D. Sertillanges, in whose exposition of St. Thomas's doctrine the following points deserve attention. The intellect's operations are, first, simple apprehension, by which it

forms a representation of the object after the manner of a simple definition (*définition incomplexe*): man, animal, whiteness, and so on; secondly, composition and division, by which the mind gives itself a more complete idea, adding to the primitive *donné* successive determinations: man is an animal, the man is white, and so on. The "simple definition" is a general idea, essential in value, the quiddity. The more complete idea, when compared to the initial notion, is like a mixed natural body in comparison with an element. Unlike the divine and angelic intellects, the mind acquires the intelligible by abstraction, cutting up reality, which is one in itself; but when it says "Man is an animal," it wishes to affirm the identity of that which is man and that which is animal. There is a foundation in reality for the cutting-up process; quality is somehow distinct from substance, and form from matter; and matter and form provide a justification for the genera and species which our attributions utilize. The compositions of nature, however, are not transferred as such to the intellect. They are adapted to the mode of the mind. Essence (*quod quid est*), when the intellect is said to simply conceive it, is taken as common to all the determinations of being. Truth is not based on essence as such but on being, for the essence as such is limit, not something positive. For this reason one says that the object of the intellect is being, and that being is the *primum cognitum* or initial stuff of all ulterior determinations. From another point of view, it is true, one says the intellect's object is the essence, but one says so then to note the mode according to which the object is revealed to us—to wit, in abstraction.[15]

In the above exposition there is much of value; for example, the remark on the entirely generic sense of essence, common to all the determinations of being, when one says the intellect simply conceives an essence, and, much more important, a footnote Sertillanges gives (p. 159) to the comparison of the "mixed natural body":

> One could add to this illuminating comparison by saying: as in nature beneath the compound and the element, there is pure (i.e., prime) matter, of which the element and the compound are successive realizations, so, beneath essences and judgments, there is in us the notion of being which essences and judgments determine. Hence the Thomist theory of the *primum cognitum*.

[15]A.-D. Sertillanges, *La Philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1950), II, 158-70. The ancestor of this work is *St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1910).

Moreover, "simple definitions," though St. Thomas does not seem to use the expression, are *one* and contain no duality of ideas open to Rousselot's objection. Again, if "animal" and "white" are successive determinations of "man," "man" apparently can be known without knowledge of his classic constituent, animality. This should pose a problem to those who accuse St. Thomas of naïve realism. They might answer, however, that progression from knowledge of "man" to the knowledge of his animality is a progression from the *minus* to the *magis universale* and that St. Thomas holds a more universal cognition is always prior to a less.

On the other hand, the fact that in nature there are certain compositions does not seem to justify all mental ones, for the intellect's apprehensions are of things in which only individuated forms actually exist. Secondly, when St. Thomas uses the term "essence" for the object of the intellect, does he really do so because it evokes abstraction? The object of the intellect is "ipsa essentia *rei;* quidditas *rei;* aliquid in rebus sensibilibus *existens;* quidditas sive natura in materia corporali *existens;* quidditas, quae est *in rebus,* non species intelligibilis." In short, the concrete essence is the object of the human intellect. St. Thomas does not seem to wish so much to call attention to the subjective mode in which it is known as to the mode in which being exists.

## II

The first paragraph of this article recalled that the intellect's proper object is known *primo et per se.* The review of authors just concluded shows a divergence of opinion concerning the nature of this first-known object, in spite of the fact that it is admittedly, according to St. Thomas, a material essence. For many the *primum cognitum* is being, even transcendental being; for one at least it is "substance" also and "living thing." Is this divergence in St. Thomas? If so, is it more than a difference of expression?

The answers to these questions should be discoverable in contexts treating of first conceptions or of a first operation of the intellect, and in those concerning the very nature of the proper object, since it is al-

ways first known. Such passages are very numerous. This article will consider some of the more notable, though its conclusions are supported by many others.

The preamble to St. Thomas's work, *De Ente et Essentia,* contains the lapidary statement: "Ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur." The first conceptions, therefore, are two. What now is their nature? Chapter I defines *ens* as anything falling under one or other of the Aristotelian categories; *essentia* means something common to all categories. *Essentia* is also that which is signified by the definition and hence called quiddity. It may likewise be called a form or nature in certain acceptances of these terms, but most properly "essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse." Since *ens,* however, is predicated primarily of substances rather than of accidents, *essentia* also is properly and truly in substances. Chapter II adds that *essentia,* in the case of composite substances, designates both matter and form.

*Essentia,* therefore, is something intrinsic to the thing; it is its mode of existence. *Ens,* however, is the thing itself, substance or accident. Such are the two first conceptions of the intellect: real being and its mode of reality.[16]

This explanation of St. Thomas, written for didactic purposes, has obviously gone beyond a phenomenal description of initial concepts and has left their particular content unspecified. It has offered two

[16]*Ens* is used by St. Thomas in several different but related senses. In the preamble of *De Ente,* it is obviously not the formal object of metaphysics, though, as the writer hopes to show later in this article, the being of metaphysics is implicit in this first conception.

[17]Cajetan, apropos of *De Ente,* cap. 1, describes the "ens primum cognitum" as "ens concretum quidditati sensibili" (*In De Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria,* Prooemium, q. 1). The "ens primum cognitum," according to Cajetan, is not the quiddity abstracted from singulars but something *in* that abstracted quiddity. The quiddity itself, abstracted by the active intellect, is presented to the possible intellect, which then conceives, not *quidditas,* but *ens.*

[18]*In I Sent.,* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7. Parallel passages are *ibid.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3; *In III Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1. The apprehension of the first operation is often called "simplex intelligentia," "simplex intuitus," expressions which give an impression of naive realism. The object of the first operation, however, is never more determined than in the above passage from the *Sentences;* nor is it ever, to our knowledge, illustrated by other examples than the trite "man," "animal," and so on. Parallel passages in which the couplet "first operation-other operation" occurs manifest the same characteristics. Cf., for example, *De Ver.,* q. 14, a. 1; *In de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 3; *De Spir. Creat.,* a. 9, ad 6; *In III de An.,* lect. 9 (ed. Pirotta, Nos. 746-47); *In I Periherm.,* lect. 3; *In I Post. Analyt.,* lect. 1.

first conceptions and in no wise determined a genetic order between them, if there be any such.[17]

In the *Scriptum super Sententiis* there is a classic passage on the intellect's "first operation." This operation is the "imagination" of the Arabs and the "understanding of indivisibles" of Aristotle. It consists in the apprehension of a "simple quiddity." It is concerned with the quiddity of a thing rather than with its *esse*. Its sign is the definition; and, *per se*, no falsity is connected with it, for the intellect has a "true judgment" of its proper object.[18]

What is the relation of this quiddity of apprehension to the *ens* and *essentia* of *De Ente*? Since here the sign of the apprehension is the definition and in *De Ente* the essence is signified by the definition, one must conclude they are somehow the same. The first operation, therefore, is an apprehension of the mode of a thing. The passage, however, suggests nothing of the particular nature of this mode.

Moreover, the apprehended quiddity could equally well be called *ens*. In the *ad primum* of *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 5, St. Thomas recognizes a way *secundum quod ens significat essentiam rerum, prout dividitur per decem genera*. Now it is precisely the *ens* falling under the Aristotelian categories, which according to *De Ente*, is a first conception. The quiddity, therefore, seems to be the first known *ens* and essence as well.

If passages on the intellect's proper object are examined, an important addition is made to what has been gathered from the "first conceptions" of *De Ente* and the "first operation" of the *Sentences*: The quiddity initially grasped is *always* one of *material* being. This might have been expected, but it is stated explicitly in connection with proper object. For St. Thomas, the object which the human intellect knows *per se* and before all else is the extramental essence of a material thing.[19] This material thing, as known in the first act of the intellect, has one invariable quasi-generic character, its materiality. Materiality, however, means here no more than sensibly perceptible determination. The proper object which is known, however, has many variant quasi-specific characteristics; it is always such or such material being, as may be deduced from St. Thomas's examples of a man, an animal, a stone, and so on.

Difficulty arises when one encounters statements that the intellect, unlike the senses, penetrates to the essence, to the substance, to the *intima rei;* the intellect is *intus legens.* One recalls that "only substances are properly defined" and that the definition is the sign of the first operation, apprehension. Remembering that definitions are by genus and specific difference, one is faced with the spectre of naïve realism. Remembering, too, that the object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material *substance,* one is inclined to understand substance as *sub stans accidentibus* and *per se stans.* The very opposition to sense perception, signalized by St. Thomas in such contexts, invites these interpretations.

A frequent textual equivalence between proper object, quiddity, and substance is not to be denied.[20] Now, St. Thomas often cites Aristotle's third book of the *Soul* as source of his doctrine concerning the intellect's proper object. If one examines its pertinent passages and St. Thomas's commentary on them,[21] one finds no mention of substance as proper object but only of *quod quid est.* But in his commentary on the third book of *De Anima,* lect. VIII (n. 705), St. Thomas refers to "the seventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*" as his source,[22] and there Aristotle does identify substance and *quod quid est.* He is engaged in polemic against Platonic ideas. Substance, he says, not only possesses a quiddity, but the quiddity *is* the substance. There is an identity, in the case of substances, between their being and their quiddity. The substance is that by which it is; the predicate which signifies its essence is not attributed to the subject as to another thing but represents the very reality of the subject. Accidents, however, are a different case; wishing to say what they are, one is obliged

[19]Cf., for example, *In I Sent.,* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; *De Ver.,* q. 8, a. 7; *In III de An.,* lect. 8 (ed. Pirotta, No. 717); *ST,* I, q. 87, a. 3.

[20]Cf. *In IV Sent.,* d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 2; *ST.* III, q. 76, a. 7; q. 75, a. 5, ad 2; *CG,* III, cap. 56.

[21]Cf. *In IV Sent.,* cap. 4, n. 7, and cap. 6, n. 7 (ed. Didot). In St. Thomas's commentary, cf. *In III De An.,* lect. 8 (ed. Pirotta, Nos. 705, 717) and lect. 11 (Nos. 761-62).

[22]The "Septimum Metaphysicae" is the sixth book of modern Aristotelian editions; cf. cap. 6. In St. Thomas's commentary, cf. *In VII De An.,* lect. 5 (ed. Cathala, Nos. 1346-80).

[23]Cf. *Metaphys.,* Z, 6 (1031-32) and commentary on these pages by S. Mansion, *Le Jugement d'existence chez Aristote* (Louvain-Paris, 1946), pp. 230-31.

[24]*ST,* I, q. 29, a. 2. The same doctrine is found in *In I Sent.,* d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5; d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 7; *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 1; *ST,* II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3. Many places where Aristotle uses *usia* in the sense of essence are listed by S. Mansion, *Le Jugement d'existence chez Aristote,* p. 166, n. 36. Cf. also p. 240, n. 90.

[25]*In II Sent.,* d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 7.

to say they are nothing but by something else, the subject they affect.[23]

Aristotle, therefore, identifies substance and quiddity to stress the fact that the quiddity, like substance, exists in the material sensible world. He draws a distinction in the case of accidents, not because they have no quiddity but because their quiddity depends on substance for its reality. The source, therefore, of the proper object-substance identification is intent on showing that the proper object of the intellect is something real, in material things themselves and not apart from them, and, since substance has reality in its own right, *per se*, the quiddity of substance is object of the intellect with a better title than the quiddity of accidents. It is the only true and proper quiddity, just as substances alone are properly things.

When St. Thomas makes use of this source, his concern is not with substance as real but as object of the intellect. This object is real being; but it is being of a certain type or essence, as it was for Aristotle also, although Aristotle's main interest was its reality rather than its mode. In other words, the substance which is proper object is only substance in the sense of mode of being for St. Thomas, substance in the sense of essence.

Though St. Thomas does not include substance among the synonyms of essence in *De Ente*, he elsewhere recognizes such a usage.

> The word substance is used in two ways. In one the quiddity of a thing, which the definition signifies, is called substance, as when we say the definition signifies the substance of a thing. This substance the Greeks called *usia*, which we call essence.[24]

Moreover, he explicitly says that this substance meaning essence is sometimes only the essence of an accident. "In one usage substance is the same as essence, and thus is found in all categories, just as essence; and this is signified when one asks: What is whiteness?—Color."[25]

The conclusion is obvious: St. Thomas, affirming that the intellect's proper object is substance, means no more than when he calls it essence or quiddity. The quiddity apprehended is not initially grasped as something underlying accidents or as existing in itself rather than in a *subjectum inhaesionis*. It is initially grasped as a certain type of thing,

as *such being,* but, if one may so speak, is no more known to be distinctly substantial than it is known to be distinctly accidental.

Penetration to the *intima rei,* to the "very essence of a thing," to a "naked quiddity," something which the senses do not perceive, has the same meaning as apprehension of a quiddity or of substance in the sense of essence, though there is little wonder that such expressions, in contexts sharply contrasting intellect and sense and appealing to the fact that *quod quid est* is the proper object of the intellect—an object which is initially apprehended—should be taken by the uninitiate for naïve.

St. Thomas himself has indicated that such expressions are to be understood with reservations. Accidents wrap the essence round, but only "as it were" (*quasi circumvolvuntur ipsi essentiae*). To arrive at the intimate nature of things one must pass,

> . . . *as it were,* through certain doors. This is the manner of human apprehension, which from effects and properties proceeds to knowledge of the essence of a thing, and since in so doing there must be a certain discourse, human apprehension is called *ratio,* although it terminates at *intellectus,* in that the inquiry brings one to the essence of a thing.[26]

Penetration, therefore, is a figure of speech. It belongs to intellect as opposed to sense and—so it would seem from the text just quoted—to that intellection which comes after ratiocination.

Penetration, however, is not limited to this later intellection. At the risk of charges of naïve realism, it must be said that for St. Thomas penetration certainly begins in initial apprehension. The first reason for saying so is that the essence to which the intellect penetrates is its proper object, and initial apprehension from sense data already grasps that proper object. It is difficult to show this from many texts concerning penetration. On the one hand, they make explicit mention of *ratio*; on the other, the quiddity is said to be the proper object of *ratio* as well as of *intellectus.* But if penetration did not begin in initial apprehension, it could not begin later. All knowledge comes from sense, according to St. Thomas, and it reaches the intellection after

[26] *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1. Cf. also *Quodl.* VIII, q. 2, a. 2 (4) and especially *ST*, II-II, q. 8, a. 1. In the latter text are found the expressions "quasi intrinsecus penetrare" and "quasi ab exteriori." The origin of cognition in sense is given as the reason for the last.

the discourse of reason only by passing through the intellection before it. Reasoning merely builds upon, develops the implications of, first apprehensions. Initial apprehension could not be called intellection at all if it did not "read within."

A direct argument is provided by *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 12, which not only distinguishes intellect and sense, but also intellection and reasoning. After the usual etymology of the word *intellectus* and the restriction of sense to externals, whereas intellect alone reaches to the essence of a thing, the text continues:

> But the intellect works on in various ways, reasoning and investigating further from things' essences which it has comprehended. The word intellect therefore has a double meaning: one according as it refers to that alone from which the name was first given, and in this acceptance we are properly said to understand [*intelligere*] when we apprehend the quiddities of things . . . In another acceptance intellect has a broad meaning as, extending to all operations, it embraces opinion and ratiocination . . .

The point, therefore, is made. The intellect, even in its initial apprehensions, penetrates to the essences of things. The perfection of penetration may well be reserved to the intellection after ratiocination, but there is also a penetration which comes before it.

Of what nature, however, is the object to which the intellect penetrates in initial apprehension? Does not St. Thomas's relegation of the knowledge of accidents to sense and of substance to intellect indicate that initial apprehension always grasps substantial determinations, strictly generic or specific, of a material thing?

The attribution to the senses of the knowledge of accidents in no wise indicates that initial apprehension always grasps strictly generic or specific determinations of material substances; and, as will be seen later in this article, perhaps it is only an accidental mode of being which the immediately abstracting intellect ever *explicitly* grasps, notwithstanding St. Thomas's frequent use of *homo* and other substantial examples as apprehended quiddities.

St. Thomas's affirmation of the unknowability of essential principles, of the latent character of substantial forms, of the difficulty in arriving

at perfect knowledge of material things are all opposed to an immediate abstraction of explicit substantial determinations. The basic answer to the objection, however, is the difference between sense knowledge and intellection, a difference often overlooked because of the ambiguity of cognitional vocabulary applied to both sense and mind. For St. Thomas, all intellection is a function of the ontological perfection, *being*. The grasp of a quiddity is the grasp of a mode of being, and sensation does not grasp being. Not, of course, that being is absent from sensation; if it were, intellectual knowledge would not derive from sense.

> Although there be being [*esse*] in sensible things, the "ratio" of being [*ratio essendi*] or the intention of a being [*intentio entis*] sense does not apprehend; just as it does not apprehend any substantial form except indirectly, but only sensible accidents.[27]

The intellect, however, *does* apprehend the "ratio" of being. Indeed, without it, it apprehends nothing. (This is a proper sense in which being is the intellect's first conception.)

Everything is said about "penetration" when one has said it is intellection. The former can be clarified only in the degree that one can clarify the latter. The object of penetration, the "intima," may just as well be called the intelligible. If it is a substance, it does not lie at a deeper level; it merely exists in its own right and can be known as doing so, though nothing indicates that it is so known in an initial apprehension. If it is an accident, it does not exist in its own right and cannot be known as doing so, but it can be understood with reference to being. If it is known by sense, it is not understood by sense, for sense cannot make that reference.

It may be well to insist here that accidents for St. Thomas have their "intima" just as well as substances do, and that intellect alone

[27] *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6. This text illustrates St. Thomas's usual manner of speaking about sense cognition: intellect apprehends the "ratio," sense apprehends "only accidents." One should not conclude that therefore accidents have no "ratio essendi"; they have, but sense does not apprehend it. On Thomist doctrine such as the above, cf. Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste*, p. 218; J. de Finance, *Cogito cartésien*, pp. 159-60.

[28] *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3. St. Thomas frequently speaks of the quiddity or "ratio" of various accidents and even of their definition, both indications that they have "intima" which is matter for intellection rather than sensation. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; *CG*, I, cap. 22; *ibid.*, III, cap. 41; *In II De An.*, lect. 1 (ed. Pirotta, No. 213); *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 3 (ed., Cathala, No. 1312); *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 3. *De Ente*, cap. 6 (ed. Roland-Gosselin) is devoted to the definition of accidents.

penetrates there. The "doors" to the essence, its "wrappings" and "surroundings," are themselves essences, modes of being.

> The first operation regards the very nature of a thing, according as the thing understood acquires a certain grade among beings, whether the thing be complete, a whole of some sort, or incomplete, a part *or an accident.*[28]

The "intima," therefore, do not differ from the quiddity or from substance in the sense of essence. An examination of these terms designating the intellect's proper object does not reveal that any specifically substantial determination is explicitly known in initial apprehension, since they directly envisage a thing's intelligibility and therefore apply to accidental determinations as well as to substantial.

## III

The content of the intellect's initial grasp of its proper object may not seem sufficiently decided by the texts examined concerning that proper object and the intellect's first operation and conceptions. There is another group of statements which stress the *confusion* of initial knowledge. The doctrine of these texts is worth considering both as a confirmation of what has already been seen and also as introduction to the *progress* of the intellect to a better knowledge of material essences. A detailed examination of texts concerning the initial confused knowledge would exceed, however, the limits of this article.

St. Thomas, following Aristotle, holds that a certain confusion is inseparable from the point of departure of the knowledge of any thing. This point of departure seems to the casual reader a mélange of principles and conceptions, of transcendentals and of quiddities, whose respective priorities and relations are difficult to determine. The texts concerning it are best divided into those concerning the *acquisition* of knowledge and those concerning the *analysis* of previous acquisitions. From the former it is clear that the confusion of initial knowledge, whether of sense or intellect, is relative to subsequent distinction. It is the confusion of a whole whose parts as such are still unknown. Wherever the progress toward more distinct knowledge begins, it be-

gins from *some* sort of whole or universal notion. Is this whole the transcendental concept of being? St. Thomas answers that the priority in acquisition of concepts must be decided by their relation to the intellect's proper object. The first fruit of abstraction is always the quiddity of a material thing.[29]

From the initial concept of a material thing the transcendental notion of being is not, however, entirely excluded. It is there, but only implicitly; *analysis* of the initial apprehension reveals its presence and is necessary to reveal it. Progressions of concepts such as *ens-animal-homo* are analytical progressions, the fruit of reflection. They mark an order *secundum rationem intelligibilem tantum;* one does not understand a thing as a living being before one understands it as a being, just as one does not understand that which is a man to be human before one understands it to be alive.[30] "Reduction" to *ens primum notum* means a reduction to the transcendental notion of being in the order of analysis, but it means a reduction to the quiddity concept in the order of acquisition from sense data.

At the point of departure of the knowledge of material essences, the intellect therefore is in possession of an initial concept with implicit transcendental value inasmuch as it is implicitly the transcendental idea of being, and with explicit, but obscure, "specific" value, inasmuch as it is the concept of a thing affecting the senses in one way or another. From this confused and imperfect knowledge the intellect departs upon the quest of the scientific definition, without, perhaps, ever being able to attain this goal but at least able to approach it. To do so, it must integrate into its initial knowledge the subsequent apprehensions of the same material thing. It must "articulate" them with its first concept, to use De Tonquedec's expression; it must "add to the primitive *donné,*" as Sertillanges says, to acquire that "more complete idea" which to the first is like a "mixed natural body in comparison with an element."

This articulation or addition (both terms are metaphorical) is made *possible* by the implicit knowledge of transcendental being. F. Van Steenberghen, discussing the concept of being *primum notum,* and its

[29] *ST,* I, q. 85, a. 8.

[30] *De Spir. Creat.,* a. 3, ad 17.

[31] *Epistémologie* (Louvain, 1947), p. 120; *Epistemology,* trans. Rev. Martin J. Flynn (New York, 1949), p. 131.

[32] G. Verbeke, "Le Développement de la connaissance humaine d'après saint Thomas," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* (1949), 437-57.

relation to "empiric concepts" such as the known quiddities of material things, writes: "The sole new conceptual element of the empiric concept is the reference or relation of such a datum of experience to the fundamental concept of being."[21]

Now it would be wrong to understand this reference to transcendental being as a sort of patchwork, the "new element" or sense datum being somehow *extrinsically* added to a fundamental concept already possessed, or to understand the reference itself as a conscious reference in the new apprehension. The reference of the new empiric concept is discoverable when the quiddity concept is analyzed, for every quidditative concept is implicitly the transcendental notion of being, as has been said. The addition of the new datum is, properly speaking, not an addition at all. Being is contracted to its inferiors *per modum expressioris conceptus.* G. Verbeke has happily called it "immanent precision" and explains the integration of new experience as follows. The immanent precision occurs unconsciously in every abstraction from sense data and without the intervention of judgment, for by our intellectual nature we possess a "virtual" knowledge of the idea of being, and in abstraction this virtual knowledge is not only actualized but actualizes or "valorizes"—that is, renders intelligible to us—the sense data. These sense data thus actually known by the intellect and distinct in themselves are yet confused in respect to subsequent cognitions. But the idea of being, implicit in every apprehension, provides the basis for integration of subsequent apprehensions with an initial one; it is implicitly present in all of them and it "potentially" includes all of them.[22]

However, the fundamental role of the transcendental concept of being in the acquisition of knowledge according to St. Thomas is only a general role. The process of knowing material essences comports particular factors. Beyond initial apprehension, no factor in the further knowledge of material essences seems more important than the passage from sensible effects to their cause.

## IV

Authors say that the statement that material essences are known from their effects means that the intellect has no direct intuition of

such essences, does not know them *per seipsas* even though it knows them *in seipsis*, since the essences "are present in their sensible effects which we perceive, and from which our intellect abstracts them as quiddities."[33] This may be true, but how precisely does the intellect "abstract" the quiddity of a cause from its effects? Is this abstraction for St. Thomas a simple apprehension prior to reasoning, or is it a more complex process?

Certain texts on first reading give the impression that initial apprehension prior to all discourse is sufficient to know the quiddity of a *substantial* cause. Thus, in *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, the intellect grasps essences in three ways. In one, abstracting from individuating characteristics, it grasps the essences of sensibly perceptible things; for example, the pure essence of man, which consists in what belongs to man as man. In a second way, through causes or effects proportionate to them, it grasps the essences of things which are not sensibly perceived.[34] In a third way, through a knowledge of their purposes, the intellect grasps the essences of artifacts which have never yet been seen.

Now it would be entirely wrong to understand this text as excluding reasoning from the grasp of material essences. The abstraction of which there is here question does not limit the knowledge of essences to simple apprehension prior to discourse; effects and causes have as true a role (though a different one) in their cognition as in that of the sensibly nonperceptible. The proof of this is *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1. St. Thomas here distinguishes the human grasp of essences from the angelic. The human is an apprehension

> . . . which proceeds from effects and properties to the knowledge of the essence of a thing, and because in this process a certain discourse is necessary, man's apprehension is called reason, although it terminates at understanding, in that its investigation leads to the essence.

The context shows indubitably that the essence of substantial ma-

[33]Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste*, pp. 222-23. Maritain, in the world of material things other than man and his artifacts, limits "in seipsis" to cognition of accidental forms. A. Brunner, *La Connaissance humaine* (Paris, 1943), p. 262, limits it to artifacts and "social functions."

[34]Many parallel texts apply the procedure from effects to cause to a knowledge of separated substances (angels) and God but deny "proportion" in these cases. When the effects are proportionate to their cause, this method applies to knowledge of material things. Cf., for example, *In de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; q. 6, a. 3; a. 4, ad 2.

terial things is under discussion, for the properties in question are accidents perceived by sense and imagination. Since abstraction is not mentioned and since apprehension is mentioned only to be called "reason," one might even argue that it is *only* by discourse, proceeding from effects to cause, that substantial material essences can be known. This second text would thus contradict the first adduced.

The contradiction is not real. It is due to the fact that the reader of St. Thomas juxtaposes the two texts and supposes each to be an exhaustive treatment of the question interesting him. The fact is that according to St. Thomas both simple apprehension and discourse are employed in knowing the substantial essences of material things. They are employed, however, at different stages in the process of knowing such essences; and, as will be seen, the simple apprehension is employed more than once, even in the knowledge of the same essence.

If the texts are carefully examined, all conflict disappears. In Distinction 23, the problem is how man knows the essence of a *habit*. Habits, says St. Thomas, are not sensibly perceptible; and hence their essences cannot be abstracted from them but must be known either from their causes or from their effects, these latter being sensibly perceptible. Abstraction, therefore, has a role in the cognition of habits and indirectly serves the deduction of their essences but directly affects their effects. In Distinction 35, however, the problem is whether men possess a divine gift called "understanding" by which, *supernaturali lumine, mens intantum elevetur ut ad ipsa spiritualia aspicienda introducatur*. St. Thomas accordingly orders his exposition to show the natural deficiency of man in understanding material essences without discourse, while at the same time leaving man the possibility of elevation to an understanding of *spiritualia* without discourse. To mention abstraction from the individuating notes with which material things are sensibly perceived would complicate the issue unnecessarily. Instead he introduces the contrast of angelic cognition, which grasps the essences of material things, not in abstraction, but *per seipsas* and then proceeds to show that man lacks such an understanding of them—even though he possesses a nondiscursive grasp of first principles. But, adds St. Thomas, the discourse of human reason terminates nonetheless at an understanding of these essences.

There is thus no contradiction between the two texts. The first explicitly mentions abstraction; the second explicitly mentions discourse. Neither is said to be the sole operation. Their opposition is the opposition between *intellectus,* or understanding, and *ratio,* or the discursive movement which starts from one understanding and terminates at another. The sensible data which are the point of departure for progress by discourse to the essences of habits are also the point of departure for progress by discourse to the essences of material things. At both points of departure there is an abstraction; the essences, however, at whose knowledge discourse terminates, are different. In the case of habits, they are essences of things which themselves are not sensibly perceptible; in the case of material objects, they are essences of things which come under sense perception. The former cannot be apprehended before discourse; the latter can, but they will be better apprehended when discourse, starting from the initial apprehension, terminates at a second. It is this second apprehension of the material essence, not the initial one immediate upon sense perception, which is parallel to the apprehension of the essences of habits.

Not everyone will be content with the above solution. Suspicions of naïve realism are difficult to eradicate. Here they will point to the expression "pure essence," found in *In III Sent.,* d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, and inquire whether the concept of "man as man" is not a cognition of the specific essence.

If the cognition of a specific essence means a cognition of strict specific differences and if this text concerns only the apprehension prior to discourse, then "man as man" is *not* cognition of a specific essence. But the apprehension of a "pure essence" prior to all discourse can be called a specific essence in the sense that it is knowledge of *some* kind of thing and not indifferently of any thing whatever. In other words, it can be called a specific essence in the sense that it is a predicamental concept and not a transcendental, in the sense that it is the quiddity of a material thing and hence has some determination. The expression "pure essence of man as man," when it applies to an initial apprehension from sense data, merely excludes what belongs to man as "this man"—that is, his individuating notes. If one wishes to say that in this initial apprehension strictly specific differences are yet *confusedly* included, well and good; but it is difficult to see how such an inclusion, in which precisely the strict specificity of

differences disappears, can be considered as knowledge of such a difference, the very notion seeming to demand a clear cognition of it. But to go further and say that an apprehension of man as man excludes not only individuating notes but also the *partes materiae*—the integral parts of the human body—is, in our opinion, to go beyond the scope of an initial apprehension and to make the Thomist apprehension or "abstraction" of man as man refer *exclusively* to the cognition after discourse.

But if, from the above examination of *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, and d. 35, q. 3. a. 2, sol. 1, it is clear that both simple apprehension and discourse have roles to play in the knowledge of material essences, the expression "*abstract* an essence from its effects" has not yet been justified. There is a distinction between a thing and its effect, and it seems that the effects alone explicitly terminate the abstractive operation. Should not one therefore say that, from the abstracted *quiddities of effects,* one reasons to the quiddity of their *cause*? In this case the quiddity initially and explicitly apprehended would be the quiddity of an accident.

There is much to be said in favor of this view. In the first place, it is certain that in knowing the essence of habits it was not the habit itself but its perceptible and therefore material effects which were abstracted. It is also certain that, in general, in the case of material things St. Thomas holds we proceed from effects, properties, accidents sensibly perceived to a knowledge of the essence of their cause or subject; and in the very text of *In III Sent.*, d. 35, this procedure is not called abstraction at all but discourse. Knowing that discourse demands previous conceptions upon which to reason and that such previous concepts derive ultimately from sense and are never first conceptions distinct from some predicamental concept of an essence, one is forced to find a knowledge of effects in the concepts initially apprehended from sense data. The initially abstracted concepts should therefore be quiddities of color, shape, size, and so on, grasped singly or in a group. From such quiddities one may conceivably reason to the quiddity of their cause and thus know the essence of the thing which is their cause.

But, for St. Thomas, *humanitas, equinitas, arboreitas,* and the like,

often seem to be initial apprehensions, immediate abstractions from sense data. It is certain that for St. Thomas men, animals, and trees are not accidents. If, therefore, one can immediately abstract humanity, equinity, and arboreity, there seems no reason why discourse should start from knowledge of accidental quiddities. It seems that the intellect is already in possession of the quiddity of a substance and that the essences of accidents should be deducible from it by a *demonstratio propter quid.*

The difficulty with this view is to show that such abstractions as humanity and the like, when immediately from sense data, are truly substantial. St. Thomas sometimes says we first conceive man according to some genus, remote or proximate, and certain accidents, thereby meaning that the truly specific difference of man is still unknown and dependent upon subsequent cognitions to become known.[35] Thus one may have, for example, the provisional definition *animal bipes.* But is *animal,* even in such a definition, the product of an immediate abstraction, of an initial apprehension from sense data? By immediate abstraction is not here meant mere abstract knowledge which, as it were, instantaneously incorporates the data of present experience with knowledge already acquired. By immediate abstraction is here meant an abstraction which depends entirely upon the present data and is not partially constructed from previous experiences. By such an abstraction, does the intellect grasp *animal?*

It may be seriously doubted that it does, or that St. Thomas ever thought it does. In this connection it may be well to quote the opinion expressed by P. Geny, when reviewing Le Rohellec's article in *Xenia Thomistica,* on the instantaneous apprehension of sensible essences:[36]

> Is there, by simple apprehension, cognition of complex essences or only of simple essences? Placed for the first time in the presence of man, does the child form a confused concept of the essence of man? I wonder. I am inclined to believe that after the fundamental

[35] *Ibid.*, q. 6, a. 3.

[36] *Gregorianum* (1925), p. 465.

[37] It is not necessary to consider "complex essences" as product of an intellectual elaboration. There are only two possibilities, given Geny's supposition of a working of the mind in the production of complex essences. These essences may be merely intellectual assimilations of a complex object or thing, of a group of objects, "... m'apparaissant comme un tout caractérisé, ayant une certaine stabilité" (F. Van Steenberghen, *Epistémologie,* p. 120). But, thus understood, complex essences coincide with what is called in this article a knowledge of the effects of a real essence.

concepts which St. Thomas puts first in the order of acquisition (being, not-being, distinction, unity, multitude . . .) come those which result from abstraction from simple sensible data: the extended, the resistant, the luminous, the colored, the sweet, the bitter, the sonorous . . . and that there is already a working of the mind in the assembly of several of these concepts to give the essence of man, dog, wood, etc. In other words, the fundamental function of the intellect is 'deindividualisation,' not by *rejection* of individual notes—but, if I may so speak, by *filtration* of that alone upon which the human intellect has a purchase: the quiddity.

The author of the present article does not endorse every word in the above quotation. For example, the priority of being and other fundamental conceptions to Geny's "simple essences" is, he thinks, analytical rather than acquisitive; they are merely implicit in the temporally first conceptions. He wishes rather to stress the priority of "simple" essences of accidents over "complex" essences of substances. If simple essences are abstracted immediately from sense data and if complex essences, such as man, require a working of the mind, what, according to St. Thomas, can be a "humanity" known by abstraction?

There are two possibilities. Either "humanity" is a cognition whose explicit content is one determined only by *accidental* characteristics immediately abstracted from sense data, or it is a cognition whose explicit content includes *substantial* characteristics, the abstraction of which, however, is not immediate and is "abstraction" only in the sense of being abstract knowledge rather than concrete. In the former case, "humanity" is *explicitly* nothing but a knowledge of the effects of the real essence of the thing and the same as the abstracted quiddities of these effects, provided they be grasped as a unit and as in a determined subject. In the latter case, it is explicit knowledge of the subject of these accidents, the essence of man himself, present as cause in its effects, and by reason derived from them.[87]

The above solution supposes that St. Thomas applies "abstraction" to a cognition occurring after the discourse of reason as well as to one occurring before it. Such is the case. Abstraction according to St. Thomas is a cognition of simple apprehension, of the "first operation,"

but for St. Thomas apprehension or understanding terminates discourse as well as precedes it. It is first in relation to judgment, for every judgment must be logically preceded by an apprehension; but once judgment has occurred and discourse followed upon it, a new "first operation" occurs.

In the *De Trinitate,* q. 5, a. 3, abstraction is described at length. St. Thomas distinguishes abstraction properly so called from "separation" or judgment. Abstraction properly so called is an operation of the intellect which

> . . . regards the nature of a thing according as the thing understood attains some grade among beings, whether the thing be complete, a whole of some sort, or incomplete, a part or an accident . . . [and] in the operation by which [the intellect] knows the quiddity of any thing whatsoever, it distinguishes one from another when it understands what this one is, understanding nothing of the other—neither that it is with it, nor separate from it . . . This distinction is rightly called abstraction, but then only when those things of which one is understood without the other, are together in reality.

There is nothing in the above description of abstraction which *limits* it to the apprehension before discourse, though it is clear that astraction is not discourse itself, for it is not the operation according to which the intellect explicitly judges, which it must do in order to reason.

Shortly after the above explanation St. Thomas gives an example of *abstractio universalis a particulari.* From it, it seems clear that abstraction is also applied to apprehension after discourse. The example is the familiar "man as man" cognition; but it is a very *developed* notion of man which is offered, for it is equivalent to his strict definition.

> *Per se* belong to man a rational soul and a body composed of the four elements; hence without these parts man cannot be understood, but one must put them in his definition: therefore they are parts of the species and form. But finger, foot and hand, and other similar parts, are outside the understanding of man. Hence, the essential notion of man does not depend on them, and man can be understood without them . . . these parts are called material parts. They are not put in the definition of the whole . . . They are indeed parts

[38] *In de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 5.

of the essence of Socrates and Plato; not, however, of man as man, and therefore man can be abstracted by the intellect from these parts. And such abstraction is [abstraction] of the universal from the particular.[38]

Now no one, to our knowledge, denies that the strict definition according to St. Thomas involves discourse. If, therefore, a cognition equivalent in explicit content to a strict definition is an abstraction, it seems clear that the term is applied by St. Thomas to the understanding or apprehension after discourse as well as to the apprehension before it. "Abstraction" is thus any knowledge of a thing without knowledge of its individuating notes, and it may be found in the progress of cognition at any point where these notes are omitted. Between "abstractions" discourse may intervene and indeed must intervene, if they are knowledge of the same material thing and if the subsequent abstractions are to be integrated with the former. It must also intervene if the subsequent abstractions are knowledge of the essence of the cause of the object or objects first abstracted, for these first abstracted objects, St. Thomas repeatedly indicates, are the quiddities of effects. The expression "abstraction of an essence from its effects" indicates, therefore, a process comporting an initial apprehension, then discourse, and finally new apprehension following upon discourse.

The passage from the quiddity effect to the quiddity cause is undoubtedly an intellectual leap, but St. Thomas never doubts its legitimacy. He finds its justification in the presence of a cause in its effects and in the doctrine of hylomorphism. According to the hylomorphic theory, the essence of a material substance is composed of two incomplete metaphysical principles, prime matter and substantial form. The latter alone is a determining principle; it is the "act" of prime matter and the source of all activity of the composite substance. In this composite substance (whether chemical compound, element, or, to use discoveries of a later date, atomic or infra-atomic particles) inhere accidental forms, subordinate determinations stemming from the substance as formal effects from their cause and intermediaries through which the substance acts upon the senses. Since these accidents are dependent upon substance for their being and since the substantial form is the sole "act" of the composite substance, it is to substantial

form and not to prime matter that accidents ultimately owe their ability to influence man's senses; and in the accidents the substantial form is therefore present, as every cause is present in its effects. Knowing these effects, the intellect possesses an open "door" to knowledge of the substantial form itself; and to know the substantial essence of a material thing, according to St. Thomas, the intellect must possess its act or form:

> Since a thing is intelligible according as it is in act, as is said in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics,* the nature or quiddity of a thing must be known according as it *is* an act of a certain kind, as occurs in the case of simple forms and substances, or according to *what* is its act, as composite substances [are known] by their forms.[39]

The substantial forms, of course, are not assimilated by the intellect in such a way that they enter the mind accompanied by their physical existence or being; but the intellect in knowing them invests them with an intentional existence or being, alien to their extra-mental material condition. The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower: "The soul, through the intellect, knows corporeal things with an immaterial, universal and necessary knowledge."[40] But when the material thing is known in this manner, it is indeed its *form* which is known:

> In the mind acquiring a knowledge from things, their forms exist by a certain action of the things upon the soul: hence the forms which are in our mind regard the things outside the soul primarily and principally according to their forms.[41]

Is this realism? It certainly is. Is it naïve? The word seems too strong, to say the least; the Aristotelico-Thomist theory of intellectual cognition and of the metaphysical constitution of matter have a finesse and an elaboration which are far removed from the crude attempts of "common sense."

## V

The review of authors given in Section I of this article admittedly raised certain questions which have been but summarily treated, or not at all. The following points, however, seem established. St.

[39] *Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 3 (italics mine). By "simple forms" and substances St. Thomas of course means angels. The "composite substances" are material ones.

[40] *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 1.

[41] *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 4.

Thomas's realism is by no means that of a "vigorous primitive"; and "naïve" scarcely seems to be the word for it. The object initially apprehended is a real essence classifiable under one of the Aristotelian categories. It is the essence of a thing which may be substance or accident, though in initial apprehension its substantiality or accidentality remains unknown. It is not, however, a transcendental *ens* without explicit mode or a mode apart from a grasp of being, and its name is *quidditas rei materialis*. As proper object, first and *per se* known, the quiddity possesses sensible determinations and is therefore in a mitigated sense "specific," but the texts which affirm that the intellect's object is "substance" mean no more than those which say it is an essence. "Penetration" for St. Thomas is not an operation which pierces a material and accidental crust to feed upon a "pure essential" or substantial core but is a figure of speech for intellection. Substance may be its object, though only indirectly and implicitly apprehended in the initial intellectual grasp of sense data; but so may accidents, for accidents as well as substances have their *intima*, their intelligibility. Moreover, it seems that for St. Thomas it is only a mode of accidental being which the initially apprehending intellect explicitly grasps. From this initial concept of a material thing, the transcendental notion of being is not excluded but, implicitly present, is that which renders possible the integration of subsequent apprehensions with the first. Finally, the "abstraction" of the essence of a substantial cause from its sensibly perceptible effects (apparently the most important particular factor in cognition of material things beyond the stage of initial apprehension) requires ratiocination and is "abstraction," not in the sense of immediate cognition, but merely in the general one of abstract knowledge; that is, knowledge of a mode of being without knowledge of its individuated condition in external reality.

## Common Sense in the Philosophy of Thomas Reid

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For the average scientist or philosopher today, common sense refers to a body of notions and opinions held by the average man of his particular time and place about things in general. No questions are asked about where these notions come from, how far they are in some sense natural to man, and how far they are learned. Reid occasionally uses the term in about this sense, making the following statement, which could as well have been made by Berkeley: "I resolve always to pay a great regard to the dictates of common sense, and not to depart from them without absolute necessity."[1] But so far as Reid's system is concerned, or that of the "common-sense" philosophers in general, this use of the term is entirely adventitious. The common sense to which they appeal is not a general body of opinions, regardless of how they are derived, but a limited number of truths which are evident to man by nature. Thus, Shaftesbury spoke of certain moral and philosophical truths as being

> . . . so evident in themselves that it would be easier to imagine half of mankind run mad . . . than to admit anything as truth which should be advanced against such natural knowledge, fundamental reason, and common sense.[2]

Shaftesbury may have been the first to introduce this use of the expression into English; he may first have found it in Cicero.[3] Reid could have gotten it from Shaftesbury; but a more likely source is Lord Kames, whose *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, published in 1751, show familiarity with Shaftesbury and make considerable use of the term. The

[1]Thomas Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind* [1763] (*The Works of Thomas Reid*, ed. by Sir William Hamilton. 8th ed. [Edinburgh: 1880]), Chap. II, sec. 8, p. 112.

[2]Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Essay II, Chap. VI, p. 424.

[3]Cicero *De Oratore* iii. 50, cited by Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Essay II, Chap. VI, p. 424.

[4]*Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Chap. II, sec. 6, p. 108.

[5]*The Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid*, delivered at graduation ceremonies in King's College, Aberdeen, 1753, 1756, 1759, 1762. Ed., with introd., from the Birkwood MS. by W. S. Humphries. Aberdeen University Series, No. 113. Aberdeen: Univ. Press, 1937. The translations are my own.

term occurs in Reid's earliest writings in precisely this special sense. Certain judgments, says Reid in one of his earliest passages, are not derived from experience or from reason but are grounded in our nature and constitution, and must be taken for granted in the common concerns of life.[4] These are the "principles of common sense" upon which the Scottish philosophy is founded. That the term is unfortunate we may admit. But in addition to the ambiguity of the term itself, we have further reason to complain that, even taking the term in the narrow sense, Reid gave it too broad an application, including under it such widely different "principles" as the fact that an infant can interpret facial expressions and the axioms of demonstrative sciences. I do not know how to pardon this carelessness. But I know that Reid's thinking was not all as shoddy as his use of the ready-made term "common sense" would indicate; and I believe it worth while to examine some of his principles of common sense for the contribution they make toward solving the problem of knowledge. I propose first what might be called a psychological investigation—whether Reid correctly describes the facts of experience when he finds these principles there. Afterward, supposing the correctness of the description, I wish to raise the epistemological question whether these alleged principles give us a reasonable basis for certitude.

## I

For the first part, I take my cue from Reid's third *Philosophical Oration*,[5] composed while the author was actively engaged in the exploration of the subject that resulted in his first major work, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*. The two leading principles which I shall develop are the two parts of his oration, so that the selection of them from among many alleged principles of common sense is his, not mine. The oration is from first to last a declaration of his departure from the school of Locke in which he had grown up.

### A

Reid's first criticism has to do with Locke's definition of knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement between two ideas. Reid suspects that this is the result of carrying over into mental philosophy the logical way of defining a proposition. The fact that judgment, for the logician, requires two terms has caused Locke to suppose that judgment as a psychological fact requires two terms but that the terms themselves are simply apprehended. The truth is that the mind sometimes holds a proposi-

tion by way of simple apprehension, as when it merely conceives or imagines or understands a proposition. In like manner, the mind very often judges, in the sense of assenting, believing, or knowing, when it has only a single term before it.

> Faced with this crowd [says Reid in his *Oration*], I am unable to discern it with my eyes without believing it to be present and being overcome with fright . . . Thus, sensation is not a simple apprehension, but is conjoined with judgment or belief.[6]

In contrast to Locke, who tried to explain how the mind combines simple apprehensions to form beliefs, Reid says, "Judgments are not formed out of simple apprehensions by composition; rather, out of natural judgments, simple apprehensions are formed by analysis."[7] In the *Inquiry*, Reid argues more directly against Hume's contention that sensation, memory, and imagination, when they have the same object, are only different degrees of strength and vivacity in the idea. Reid holds that imagination is truly a simple apprehension unaccompanied by belief. It differs, therefore, from perception and memory not merely in degree but in kind; for these latter are not simple apprehensions at all but judgments or principles of belief.[8]

Here we have, I think, a genuinely philosophical statement of the basic contention of the whole common-sense school of philosophy and a needed correction of the system of Locke and Hume. The original data of consciousness are not simply ideas of sensation and of reflection. They are perceptions, beliefs, judgments. We are as sure that the object of sensation exists as we are sure what it is. Belief or judgment is not a separate act of the mind secondary to, and dependent upon, our awareness of ideas. We assent with our minds and even respond with our bodies—as Reid's instance of stage-fright suggests—immediately upon being confronted with the data. No experience is presupposed; no inference or reasoning takes place. The judgment is simple and irreducible, as original as the apprehension with which it is given.

I incline to agree with Reid that the only reason for his predecessors' failing to observe these facts lay in their failure to divest themselves of certain idols of the theater.

**B**

This brings us to the second criticism which Reid has to make of Locke and his followers, his rejection of the "theory of ideas," by which he meant

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Chap. II, sec. 3, p. 106.
[9] John Locke, *Essay concerning the Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. VIII, sec. 15.

any theory of perception according to which the mind does not immediately perceive external and absent objects but images, likenesses, or ideas in the mind. Reid put his finger on the subjectivist origin of "the ideal hypothesis." Starting with the assumption that the mind has knowledge only of its own operations, philosophers of the Cartesian and Lockean persuasion conclude that anything can become an object of knowledge only by being resolved into elements of consciousness or ideas. In his third oration, Reid made several points against the hypothesis that I think are still worth repeating. First, he challenged the assumption that one's consciousness of his own mental states is any more original than his consciousness of the objects of memory or perception. If the one can be taken without explanation, why not the other? But, in any case, as Berkeley and Hume have adequately shown, the theory of intermediate ideas does not explain either memory or perception, but shuts one up within the prison of his own consciousness. Further, ideas, in the sense of objects distinct from the act by which they are known (which the theory requires), are not discoverable by introspection. And, finally, the whole explanation rests upon a false analogy between mental and physical activity, dating from the materialistic theories of the early atomists. This is as far as he goes in his oration. His argument in this place merely removes the barrier placed by the theory of intermediate objects in the way of his earlier contention that we have direct knowledge of external objects by sensation and of things past by memory. It leaves Reid open to all the objections against naive realism. Only as we follow the argument against the "ideal hypothesis" into the *Inquiry* do we learn that Reid's realism is not naive. Superficially his position reminds us of Locke's, with his distinction between primary and secondary qualities—the former of which give true knowledge of things, the latter not. An important difference appears, however, when we come to Reid's analysis of the data of touch. Locke had spoken of the ideas of extension, figure, and so on, as resembling the qualities which they represent.[8] Reid points out that in perception of these qualities a distinction must be made between the genuine sensations of touch, which are commonly not so much as recognized, and the qualities of extension, figure, and so on, which accompany them. Between the two there is no resemblance or any other discernible connection. One is a sensation and answers to Locke's description of an idea insofar as it is in the mind that perceives it; the other is a quality and is like nothing that ever was or could be in the mind. But the quality is given no less immediately than the sensation and is given in such a way as to be recognized as external to, and independent of, the act whereby it is perceived. The distinction seems to Reid a new and final refutation of the ideal system.

> This I would, therefore, humbly propose, as an *experimentum crucis*, by which the ideal system must stand or fall: and it brings the matter to a short issue: Extension, figure, motion, may, any one, or all of them, be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal skepticism to triumph. But if, on the other hand, they are not ideas of sensation, nor like to sensation, then the ideal system is a rope of sand, and all the labored arguments of the skeptical philosophy against a material world, and against the existence of every thing but impressions and ideas, proceed upon a false hypothesis.[10]

Here again, I think, Reid advanced beyond his predecessors in describing the facts of experience. Descartes's radical dualism of thought and extension had shut the mind up to its own ideas; Locke's limitation of the mind to ideas of sensation and reflection had had the same effect. There is no doubt that these were both greater philosophers than Reid, partly because they developed systematically their respective points of view. Reid was much more eclectic. But for this reason he was allowed insights not permitted to them. Ostensibly following the same method as Locke and nominally holding to the Cartesian distinction between matter and spirit, he nevertheless described what he found in experience in a way that broke with both these systems. Reid would agree with Locke in ruling out "innate ideas" and in affirming that all knowledge originates with sensation. But although, for Reid, knowledge begins with sensation, it does not end there. In some way "altogether mysterious and unintelligible," sensations confront the mind with objects that are not sensations, objects which bear witness to their own existence no less conclusively than sensations do to theirs.

This will have to suffice for our first question, whether Reid correctly describes our experience of cognition when he finds there not merely apprehensions but beliefs, and not ideas at all but objects. If I be accused of selecting from among many indefensible principles found in Reid those which I was pleased to defend, I plead guilty of the charge. Elsewhere[11] I have given a more complete view of Reid's doctrine; here I have selected

[10] *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Chap. V, sec. 7, p. 128.

[11] J. H. Faurot, "The Development of Reid's Theory of Knowledge," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XXI (April, 1952).

[12] Matt. Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicae*, (1ma ed., novae formae), Log., Pars II, Chap. iii, art. 6, cited in Étienne Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris, 1947), p. 22.

[13] *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Essay I, Chap. II, p. 231; Essay VI, Chap. V, p. 442.

what seemed most defensible. But, may I repeat, I have taken my cue from Reid himself and have emphasized what he also selected for emphasis in his earliest, most constructive phase.

## II

And now to the second question. Whether we do or do not agree that Reid's description is correct, would it meet the requirements for a satisfactory theory of knowledge? Would it give reasonable grounds for certitude? Reid, like Descartes, was faced with the task of putting knowledge on a solid footing after the skeptics had shaken its accepted foundations.

I have been concerned to ask whether his grounds are "reasonable" because his name has been made symbolic of "irrationalism" by Catholic scholars. The criticism of irrationalism is not intended by these men to apply to Reid any more than to others of the school; and I have no doubt of its general correctness. What I wish to inquire is whether it applies to such of Reid's tenets as those I have mentioned. The type of criticism I have reference to is clear from the following:

> At bottom, the appeal [of certain Catholic apologists] to common sense reduces itself to a restoration of Reidianism, i.e., to establishing the whole structure of true knowledge upon instinctive, hence irrational, judgments. Nothing is more pernicious than such a doctrine, nor more contrary to the nature of reason: for if thought cannot refuse these judgments, in spite of the fact that they are neither demonstrated nor evident, one must assent to certitudes which are at the same time conformable to reason (since it accepts them) and irrational (because nothing justifies them).[12]

Do these criticisms apply to the principles of common sense which we have discussed in detail: (*a*) that certain judgments are as immediate to our consciousness as any conceptions; and (b) that we do not apprehend ideas but conscious sensations on the one hand and qualities of things on the other? It is true that the knowledge which they profess to give does not rest on demonstration. But that it does not rest on evidence is less clear. Reid's contention is that it is immediately given to consciousness and is "self-evident" and "intuitive."

These terms are likely to be abused. They mean one thing for one system, another for another. But for Reid there seem to be three kinds of self-evident judgments. One is the consciousness we have of our own mental states, of sensation, pain, thinking, remembering, and so on. "The operations of our mind are attended with consciousness; and this consciousness is the evidence, the only evidence we have or can have, of their existence."[13] A second kind of self-evident judgment is the knowledge we have of objects of imagination

and conception. In this class Reid places our knowledge of abstract terms and relations. We have intuitive knowledge of these terms "for they are nothing more than they are conceived to be;—and, because they are perfectly known we can reason about them with the highest degree of evidence."[14] But it is the third kind of self-evident judgment that we are interested in when we are estimating Reid's success in breaking out of the enchanted circle of idealism. This is the kind Reid calls judgments about "contingent" truths, including perception and memory. Three things are involved in judgments of this sort: the notion or conception of the thing believed; an irresistible conviction or belief of its existence; and "that this conviction is not only irresistible, but it is immediate."[15]

> It is, no doubt, one thing to have an immediate conviction of a self-evident axiom; it is another to have an immediate conviction of the existence of what we see; but the conviction is equally immediate and equally irresistible in both cases.[16]

This last may be too strong a statement as it stands, suggesting naive realism. But we can say this much: Reid held that the total perception, including the judgment that its object exists, is an original datum of consciousness and that, furthermore, when this datum is subjected to reflection and analysis, there still remains a solid core of knowledge which cannot be reduced to subjective experience because it is apprehended as directly as the affections of consciousness themselves. So far the judgments of common sense are self-evident. And so far, I would say, Reid was not an irrationalist, whatever may be thought of Reidianism.

That Reid was himself concerned with the relation between common sense and reason appears from the earlier quotation where he volunteered to "give up all pretence to reconcile" these two if it could be shown that primary qualities are sensations. At the beginning of his studies he does not seem to have been so much concerned. In an early chapter he says of perception, memory, and certain necessary relations that they are judgments not of reason but of common sense.[17] But it is clear that by "reason" he means demonstration or experience. His early work took the form of a polemic against the systems of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, who had attempted to explain these judgments as composed of simple data. Later, Reid was careful to change his terminology.

It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason

[14] *Ibid.*, Chap. III, p. 429.
[15] *Ibid.*, Essay II, Chap. V, p. 258.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 260.
[17] *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Chap. II, sec. 5, p. 108.
[18] *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Essay VI, Chap. II, p. 428.

and common sense. It is indeed the first-born of reason; and . . . they are inseparable in nature. We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second, to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense; and, therefore, it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason.[18]

While it is not clear that this represents any real change of opinion over Reid's earlier position, it does set the relation of common sense to reason in a clearer light. Reid's developed position is that reason has a broader meaning which includes intuitive judgments and a narrower meaning which signifies the process of drawing inferences.

One expression of Reid's which demands special consideration is his repeated reference to man's "nature and constitution" as the source of the principles of common sense. The most natural way to interpret this reference —and the only way in the case of such a one as Lord Kames—is to take it to mean that the judgments of common sense originate the processes of the human organism and get their validity from this fact, coupled with the assumption of divine wisdom and purpose. I cannot deny that sometimes Reid seems to be thinking in the same way. When this is the case, I concede the argument: it puts certitude upon an irrational foundation. But there is a positivistic strain in Reid which was not present in others of his school. The notion of "causation," for instance, he treats very cautiously, preferring to limit himself in the manner of Hume to describing observed connections. And sometimes, at least, when Reid refers the principles of our knowledge to our "nature and constitution," he means simply that there is no known explanation. We do not know, he tells us, what connection exists between nerve impulses and sensation; it is the way we are constituted. Similarly, we do not know how a certain sensation of touch confronts the mind with a real quality of things; it is the way we are constituted. I feel sure that from his mature philosophy Reid eliminates the Kames point of view that our judgments of common sense originate in organic processes. Now my question is, Does this silence, this acknowledgment of a lacuna—or several lacunae—within the psychophysical account of knowledge, this failure to show a continuity of process from the quality of things to the knowledge of them, leave Reid condemned to irrationalism even on this most favorable construction of his position? I suspect that, if it does, we are all involved in the same condemnation. My hope is that epistemology can sustain its claims to be independent of psychology and that the immediacy of our perception of the external world is, as Reid also hoped, self-verifying.

# A Note on the Traditionalism of Father Ventura de Raulica (1792-1861)

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Gioacchino Ventura dei Baroni di Raulica was born at Palermo, Sicily, on December 8, 1792. In 1808 he entered the house of the Society of Jesus at Palermo, where, in due time, he became professor of rhetoric. Upon the suppression of the Society by Murat in 1817, Ventura joined the Theatines, attracted to that community because he thought it offered the best opportunity to find his vocation as a pulpit orator. Father Ventura soon distinguished himself as a preacher, an apologist, a journalist, and as an exponent of the traditionalism of De Maistre, De Bonald, and Lammenais. His funeral oration for Pius VII (1823) quickly ran through twenty editions and earned for him the sobriquet *il Bossuet italiano.*

Meanwhile, Father Ventura was advanced to positions of responsibility and prestige in his new order, becoming procurator-general in 1824 and superior-general in 1830 for a three-year term. The accession of Pope Pius IX, in 1846, seemed to herald an era of liberalism in politics, and Father Ventura espoused enthusiastically the cause of democracy and freedom. His funeral oration for O'Connell (1847) was a glorification of Italian unification and liberty, while his *Morti di Vienna* was an antiroyalist manifesto. He upheld the Sicilian Revolution of 1847-49, and he collaborated with Rosmini in projecting an Italian confederation under the presidency of the pope. (Incidentally, a third Italian philosopher, Gioberti, was instrumental in bringing this plan to nought.)

In 1848, while Pius IX fled to Gaeta and the triumvirs proclaimed the Roman Republic and convoked a constituent assembly, Father Ventura declared himself for the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers and, as minister-plenipotentiary for Sicily, formally recognized the new republic.

The French victory of August 6, 1849, forced Father Ventura to flee to France, where he remained two years at Montpellier before proceeding, in

[1]"Nous avons sans doute des théologiens, des apologistes de la religion, des philosophes, des publicistes, des orateurs, et des littérateurs très distingués; mais il n'y a que le Père Ventura qui soit en même temps et à lui seul tout cela" (Ventura, *La Raison philosophique et la raison catholique,* "Avertissement des éditeurs," p. v. Cf. *Works of Orestes A. Brownson* [Detroit, 1883], III, 180).

[2]Sources for the biographical and bibliographical data have been these: John C. Reville, S.J., "Ventura," Francesco di P. Ragonesi, O.T., "Theatines," and Umberto Benigni, "Rome" and "Sicily," *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1912); Giuseppe De Luca, "Ventura," *Enciclopedia Italiana* (1937); "Ventura," *Enciclopedia Universale Illustrada Europeo-Americana* (1929).

[3]Excerpts translated by Veitch in Benjamin Rand, *Selections from Modern Classical Philosophers.*

1851, to Paris. There he repeated his Italian success as a preacher, coming to rival even the great Lacordaire. In his very first year at Paris, he delivered the famous *conférences* at the Madeleine, while, in 1857, he preached a series of Lenten sermons at the Tuileries before Emperor Napoleon III.

On August 2, 1861, Father Gioacchino Ventura de Raulica died at Versailles. Of him Pope Gregory XVI had once said to a Frenchman:

> No doubt we have some very distinguished theologians, apologists, philosophers, journalists, orators and litterateurs; but only in Father Ventura do we have all of these at once.[1]

Father Ventura's *Opere Complete* were published in thirty-one volumes at Milan (1854-64); his *Opere Postume* appeared in Venice (1863). His earlier works include: *La Causa dei Regolari al Tribunale del Buon Senso, Elogio di Pio VII, Sull'Influenza del Secolo XVI,* and contributions to the *Enciclopedia Ecclesiastica.* He translated the *Du Pape* of the Count de Maistre as well as De Bonald's *La Legislation primitive,* and he assisted in the translation of Lammenais's *Essai sur l'indifférence. De Jure Ecclesiastico* was published in 1826. In 1828 appeared the famous *De Methodo Philosophandi* and in 1839 the apologetical treatise *Bellezze della Fede.* The *conférences* at the Madeleine were published (1852) as *La Raison philosophique et la raison catholique. Le Pouvoir politique chrétien* is the series of Lenten sermons of 1857. The later works include: *La Tradizione e Semi-Pelagiani della Philosophia, Saggio sull'Origine dell'Idee,* and *Philosophie chrétienne* (1861). Father Ventura's *Discorso Funebre pei Morti di Vienna* was placed on the *Index* by a decree of May 30, 1849.[2]

## II

It was in vain that René Descartes had written in the very first part of his *Discourse on Method* that his purpose was not

> . . . to teach the method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his own reason, but solely to describe the way in which I have endeavored to conduct my own. . . . this tract is put forth merely as a history, or . . . as a tale, in which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow. I hope it will prove helpful to some without being hurtful to any.[3]

Many had followed him into the methodical doubt, but few had succeeded any better than he in resolving satisfactorily the initial skepticism. General agnosticism, empiricism, and subjectivism came to be the philosophical fashion. At that turn in the history of thought, says Father Kleutgen,

. . . there appeared some who sought to give to philosophy a new direction, away from that into which Descartes had steered it. These men, convinced that it is impossible, by rigorous demonstrations of reason, to establish the certitude of those very truths for the acceptance of which the moral conscience calls so insistently, simply denied that such was the task incumbent upon philosophy. Philosophy, they said, has not to search for truth as if it were unknown, nor to demonstrate it as if it were uncertain; it has rather to receive and to strive to comprehend a truth transmitted to it. What the Scholastics had said of theology—namely, that it receives the truths of faith by revelation, compares them with one another, and considers their object, and, far from seeking to demonstrate these truths themselves, uses them as premises for the deduction of further truths—these philosophers applied to their science, arguing that the truths of the natural order are likewise received by a sort of faith and that philosophy should make of these the object of its study, just as theology does the truths of Revelation.[4]

[4]". . . s'élevèrent des hommes qui cherchaient a donner à la philosophie une direction nouvelle, opposée à celle qu'elle avait reçue de Descartes. Persuadés qu'il est impossible d'établir, par des démonstrations rigoureuses et rationnelles, la certitude des vérités dont la conscience morale exige si énergiquement l'acceptation, ils niaient que telle soit la tâche qui incombe a la philosophie. La philosophie, disaient-ils, n'a pas à rechercher la vérité comme si elle était inconnue, ni à la démontrer comme si elle était incertaine; il s'agit plutôt pour elle d'accepter et de chercher de comprendre la vérité transmise. Ce que les scholastiques disaient de la théologie, à savoir que, recevant les vérités de foi de la révélation, elle les compare les unes avec les autres, en examine l'objet, et, sans vouloir les démontrer elles-memes, s'en sert comme des principes pour en déduire d'autres vérités; ces philosophes l'appliquaient à la science qu'ils cultivaient, soutenant que les vérités de l'ordre naturel sont également acceptées par une certaine foi et que la philosophie doit en faire l'objet de ses études comme la théologie s'occupe des vérités révélées" (Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., *La Philosophie scholastique exposée et defendue*, tr. into French by Constant Sierp [Paris, 1868], III, 454). Father Kleutgen is concerned with Ventura, *inter alios*, throughout the third dissertation of the volume cited (pp. 432-555).

[5]". . . sic enim catholicus theologus non ille quidem ab absoluto dubio sed a fide earum veritatum, quas universa tuetur Ecclesia, disquisitionum suarum sumit initia; ita porro nisi philosophus in scepticismum labi velit, non a dubio, sed a fide eorum, quae de Deo et de animis universum humanum genus tenet semperque tenuit, incipiat necesse est" (Ventura, *De Methodo Philosophandi*, diss. prael., 62, p. 100; quoted in Kleutgen, *La Philosophie scholastique*, pp. 457-58).

[6]Orestes A. Brownson, "Philosophy and Catholicity," *Works*, III, 168.

[7]*Ibid.*

[8]Cf. Ventura, *La Raison philosophique*, p. 5; also Brownson, "Philosophy and Catholicity," p. 185.

[9]Ventura, *La Raison philosophique*, p. 21; cf. Brownson, "Philosophy and Catholicity," p. 192. Father Kleutgen assails Ventura's position that never, at any time, did the pagans lose the primitive revelation on the nature of God completely (*La Philosophie scholastique*, pp. 532-33).

Father Ventura di Raulica, the translator of De Maistre and De Bonald, and the friend and unsuccessful counselor of Lammenais, was one of those who believed that the philosopher ought to emulate the theologian by beginning his investigation with an act of faith, methodological as well as real. He wrote in 1828:

> . . . just as the Catholic theologian certainly does not begin his inquiries in absolute doubt, but in faith, as regards those truths which the universal Church preserves; so, unless the philosopher is content to slip into skepticism, he too must start out, not from doubt, but in faith as to those things which the whole human race holds, and ever has held, concerning God and souls.[5]

This mind in the philosopher Father Ventura calls the *raison catholique*, "human reason operating with principles originally supplied it by direct revelation from God, in submission to those principles, and for their preservation, development, and realization in the conduct of life, intellectual and moral."[6] The contrary mental habit, the philosophical reason, "so called by the author, because it pretends to be philosophical without being so, is human reason proclaiming its own sufficiency, operating without accepting any aid from revelation, and refusing to recognize any truth which it has not by its own unassisted efforts found out and established . . ."[7] This *raison philosophique* had its ultimate roots in the anthropological fables of classical mythology, those tales of the poets that corrupted whatever remained of the primeval revelation in the Garden. This corruption of the revelation was followed by the affirmation of the supremacy of the individual reason, by Plato, for example, and by Cicero.[8] But the remembrance of the original truth never completely disappeared in the advanced ages of paganism, says Father Ventura, so that the early Christian apologists—Irenaeus, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, St. Augustine—could argue from the fact that "the human race, even after the fall into idolatry, preserved the idea of one only God, Master and Governor of heaven and earth."[9]

This early triumph of the *raison philosophique* ended when the introduction of Christianity brought about the flowering of the *raison catholique*. The principal characteristic of the latter is that it is demonstrative rather than inquisitive: it seeks, not to know the first principles of all reasoning (for which it is dependent upon revelation witnessed by the universal assent of mankind), but, receiving the first principles upon faith, to deduce from them their consequents. Subjectively, the *raison catholique* satisfied the twofold need of men *to believe* and *to reason* (*le besoin de croire et celui de raisonner*). Historically the greatest exponents of the *raison catholique* were St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas; its greatest era was the medieval,

when the foundations were laid for Christian science, literature, art, and civilization, and when

> . . . Christian genius, inspired by faith, made the three great discoveries which changed the face of the earth: gunpowder, wherewith to rule the land; the mariner's compass, by which to rule the sea; and the printing press to direct and develop understanding.[10]

This reign of the *raison catholique* was terminated by a resurgence of the

[10]". . . le génie chétien, inspiré par la foi, a fait les trois grandes découvertes qui ont changé la face du monde: la poudre à feu pour dominer la terre, la boussole pour dominer la mer, et la presse pour dominer et développer l'intelligence." This peculiar passage occurs in *La Raison philosophique*, p. 131.

[14]A summary of Ventura's history of philosophy will be found in the first three *conférences* in *La Raison philosophique*, pp. 1-235, and a fairly good topical outline of this prolix presentation will be found in the *"Table analytique,"* pp. 523-30.

[12]"Nous pouvons ramener ce système a deux propositions. La première: 'Comme dans la théologie toute certitude repose sur la nouvelle révélation . . . et sur l'autorité de l'Église, ainsi toute certitude repose en philosophie sur la révélation primitive et sur l'autorité du genre humain.' La seconde: 'Comme le théologie procède des propositions pour lesquelles elle peut invoquer le témoignage de l'Église universelle, et ne cherche pas a les démontrer d'abord, ainsi la philosophie doit partir des vérités que le sens commun des hommes admet, pour s'en servir comme des principes, et elle ne doit pas s'attacher a les rendre d'abord certaines par une démonstration de la raison' " (Kleutgen, *La Philosophie scholastique*, pp. 463-64).

[13]See n. 5.

[14]For example: "Ainsi, la raison religieuse des anciens temps, des premiers philosophes chez les Hébreux et chez les premiers peuples de l'Orient, s'appuyant sur ce fait si certain, si éclatant, si magnifique; ne marchant qu'a la lumière de cette tradition primitive, de cette foi universelle de l'humanité . . ." (p. 36).

[15]"La philosophie démonstrative . . . n'est au fond que la raison de l'homme acceptant le frein, reconnaissant les lois, respectant l'autorité de la religion et de tout ce que saint Thomas appelle les conceptions de l'esprit communes à tous les hommes . . . C'est la raison qui aime a se soumettre a Dieu, a dépendre de Dieu, et a ne faire usage de sa liberté que dans les limites que Dieu lui a tracées, sachant bien que, ainsi qu'il est dit dans les Livres saints, Dieu est l'auteur, le Seigneur de toutes les sciences, et que toute pensée de l'homme ne doit relever que de Dieu et ne se diriger qu'à Dieu: Deus scientiarum Dominus est" (pp. 114-15). Cf. the quotation given in Brownson, "Philosophy and Catholicity," p. 185, and the latter's strange opinion that only an "ill-natured" critic would "cavil" at Father Ventura's use of Romans 12:1 ("Obsecro . . . ut exhibeatis corpora vestra hostiam viventem sanctam, Deo placentem, rationabile obsequium vestrum") by quoting only the last three words. Note also that Ventura admits a certain proper field for "inquisition": ". . . minime vero omnem subalternarum veritatum inquisitionem improbamus" (quoted by Kleutgen, *La Philosophie scholastique*, p. 472; locus in Ventura not given). Kleutgen rightly points out that this immediately raises a problem as to the criterion by which basic and subaltern truths are to be distinguished.

[16]*De Methodo Philosophandi*, No. 166, p. 376; quoted in Kleutgen, *La Philosophie scholastique*, p. 551; cf. *La Raison philosophique*, pp. 38-47, where St. Thomas is quoted and commented upon at some length as supporting Ventura's position. Note also Father Kleutgen's refutation of Ventura's appeal to Aquinas and especially his rebuke to Ventura for having persisted in declaring St. Thomas conformable with Lammenais after the condemnation of the latter (*La Philosophie scholastique*, pp. 551 ff.).

philosophical reason. The latter, like all inquisitive systems of philosophy, ran through four phases: (1) separation from religious dogma (the result of the Protestant Revolution of the sixteenth century); (2) discussion, characterized by arrogance and divisiveness (producing, in the seventeenth century, the philosophical systems of Descartes, Bacon, and Leibnitz); (3) negation, the attitude of general skepticism of the eighteenth century; and (4) deception as to its origin, aims, and results (the mark of the inquisitive philosophy in the nineteenth century).[11]

The systematic *raison catholique* which Father Ventura would oppose to the dominant philosophical reason can, according to Father Kleutgen, be reduced to two basic principles: (*a*) that philosophical certitude reposes upon divine revelation certified by the universal assent of the race and (*b*) that the true aim of philosophy is to accept and explicate the principles derived from human tradition and not to undertake their demonstration.[12]

Father Ventura's adherence to the first principle above has already been shown by the quotation of his statement that "unless the philosopher is content to slip into skepticism, he . . . must start out, not from doubt, but in faith as to those things which the whole human race holds, and ever has held, concerning God and souls;"[13] and the whole of his first *conférence* in *La Raison philosophique* is devoted to showing that the universal assent of the race is the effect of a primitive revelation.[14] His position on the second basic principle resolved by Father Kleutgen is revealed by the following passage in *La Raison philosophique*:

> Demonstrative philosophy . . . is basically only human reason accepting the limits, recognizing the laws, and respecting the authority of religion and of what Saint Thomas calls those mental attitudes common to all men. . . . It is reason delighting to subject itself to God, to depend on God, and to employ its freedom only within those bounds which God has set, well knowing that, as Scripture says, God is the Author and the Lord of all the sciences and that man's every thought must come from God and be directed to God: *Deus scientiarum Dominus est; ipsi praeparantur cogitationes* (I Kings 2:5).[15]

Father Ventura is certain that in this he is following the fathers of the Church and even St. Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, he calls Lammenais's doctrine "on the necessity of authority for the certain apprehension of truth" an *amplissimam paraphrasin* and *doctissimum commentarium* on the fourth chapter of the first book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*.[16]

Father Ventura's *raison catholique* is open to many objections. Even Orestes Brownson, who betrays a general agreement with Ventura, makes the following observation:

. . . while the truth in either order is revealed, and never could have been found out by the human reason operating by itself alone, we must beware of confounding the truth of the one order with that of the other, or of maintaining that the truths of the intelligible order are held only on the authority of the revelation. On this point the illustrious author is not so clear and precise as we could wish, and he even at times seems to favor the notion, that the principles or first truths of natural science are held only on the authority of faith, and are not, even when revealed, evident *per se* to natural reason. . . . We are far enough from charging this error upon Father Ventura, but we are obliged to say that, as far as we have seen, he does not take sufficient pains to guard his readers or hearers against it.[17]

Father Kleutgen attacks the system from many points: he rejects the idea that universal assent can be the ultimate motive or rule of certitude; he protests the distortion of St. Thomas's doctrine on the necessity of revelation to fit Father Ventura's radically different thought; he denies that Ventura proves an unbroken tradition commanding universal assent historically *de Deo et de animis*; and he disproves the contention that the *raison catholique* is analogous to Catholic theological investigation, as Father Ventura asserts.[18]

It is not a little difficult to see how Father Ventura could accommodate easily the last two of the six propositions which Bautain was required to sign in the presence of the archbishop of Paris.[19] Moreover, the Encyclical *Qui Pluribus* of Pius IX seems to contradict his conception of the role of reason in theology.[20]

[17]"Philosophy and Catholicity," p. 190.

[18]Father Kleutgen discusses the claim that theology is purely "demonstrative," never "inquisitive" (*La Philosophie catholique*, pp. 465 ff.).

[19]"5. Quoad has quaestiones varias ratio fidem praecedit debetque ad eam nos conducere. 6. Quamvis debilis et obscura reddita sit ratio per peccatum originale, remansit tamen in ea sat claritatis et virtutis, ut ducat nos cum certitudine ad (cognoscendam) existentiam Dei . . ." (Denzinger: *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [1937], Nos. 1615-16; cf. the similar propositions signed by Augustine Bonnetty, *ibid.*, Nos. 1649-52).

[20]*Ibid.*, No. 1635.

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***The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry.*** **By W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. With Two Preliminary Essays Written in Collaboration with Monroe C. Beardsley. Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1954. Pp. xviii + 299. $4.00.**

Mr. Wimsatt as an aesthetician is a realist in the best Aristotelian dualist tradition, with a wide knowledge of the classical and medieval sources in rhetoric. He is, likewise, an academic scholar and critic with an assured pre-eminence, and at the same time he has been willing to accept and explore the techniques of "explication" and to apply to literature whatever modern semantics and psychology have disclosed about the writing process. His position among American critics is, consequently, almost uniquely advantageous for the expression of the Christian-Aristotelian tradition in literary criticism.

His critical essays of the last fifteen years are here gathered into a roughly-organized whole and allow us a focused view of the quiet and hitherto scattered work he has done.

*The Verbal Icon,* once its significance is made clear, is the correct title for this book. Mr. Wimsatt is, through it, insisting upon the perception of a word in literature (and indeed in all usage) in its full physical and intentional reality. "The verbal image which most fully realizes its verbal capacities is that which is not merely a bright picture (in the usual modern meaning of the term image) but also an interpretation of reality in its metaphoric and symbolic dimensions. Thus: The Verbal Image" (p. 1). This Janus-faced definition is fully explored and justified in the best of these essays.

It becomes, in fact, the constant expression of a solid dualism. "Poetic structure is always a fusion of ideas with material, a statement in which the solidity of symbol and the sensory verbal qualities are somehow not washed out by the abstraction. For this effect the iconic or directly imitative powers of language are important . . ." (p. 115). "Poetry is not an affair of pure ideas. . . . Poetry is both sense and sound, and not by parallel or addition but by a kind of union—which may be heard in onomatopoeia and expressive rhythm and in various modes of suggestion, extension, and secret verbal functioning" (p. 182). These snatches, together with the rather extended credo on pages 48-49, leave the Aristotelian position of the author clear and clearly symbolized in the title.

Under the impact of semanticists, all of them more or less radically

monistic in their view of reality, Mr. Wimsatt is more than willing, even anxious, to assert all of the physical or strictly "aesthetic" qualities of language. Thus, in all the essays of the third part of this book we have some fresh and carefully integrated thought on rhyme, on rhetorical devices (such as the pun, simile and metaphor, onomatopoeia, symbol) and some shrewd handling of new critical terms like "vehicle," "texture," and "intension" to exploit every advantage of linguistic study in throwing light on the structure of poetry and the mastery of language displayed by every great poet.

But Professor Wimsatt does not thereby become a semanticist. His verbal icon is as powerfully denotative, or intentional, or abstractive as it is a symbol or sensible icon. This is the powerful fulcrum on which Mr. Wimsatt's criticism turns. It is the source of the whole group of essays in the second part of the present book, and it applies the doctrine of the icon to the most difficult problems in criticism. In "The Concrete Universal" we have the best essay in the collection; and "The Substantive Level," "The Structure of Romantic Nature Imagery," and the final essay of the book, "Poetry and Christian Thinking," are admirable applications of his basic view of the word to very knotty critical problems. The following paragraph from "The Concrete Universal" is the theme of the whole book:

> Rhetorical analysis of poetry has always tended to separate from evaluation, technique from worth. The structure of poems as concrete and universal is the principle by which the critic can try to keep the two together. If it be granted that the "subject matter" of poetry is in a broad sense the moral realm, human actions as good or bad, with all their associated feelings, all the thought and imagination that goes with happiness and suffering . . . then the rhetorical structure of the concrete universal, the complexity and unity of the poem, is also its value. Complexity of form is sophistication of content. The unity and maturity of good poems are two sides of the same thing. The kind of unity which we look for and find in poetry is attained only through a degree of complexity in design which itself involves maturity and richness (p. 82).

By way of criticism it should be noted that Mr. Wimsatt does not seem consistently aware of the metaphysical depth of his own position. The unity within the poem, the unity of reality in which both poem and nature exist, and the harmony in creation in which truth, morality, and art exist are occasionally confused in important contexts. Thus, he seems to allow (p. 35) that there can be "fine poems" about nothing; he is willing to "say frankly" that a poem may be a great poem and yet be an immoral one. (He offers *Antony and Cleopatra* as an example!) And he seems at times to dally with a kind of idealism and suggests that rhetoric and poetry

are not really in contact with reality (pp. 217 and xvii). I must emphasize that these few spots are puzzling chiefly because they break in upon a very consistent realism.

Finally, feeling as I do that the theme of Mr. Wimsatt's book is the verbal icon and its metaphysical implications, I believe that a totally wrong emphasis has been given by the arrangement of the essays. The whole first section, including the introduction, is polemic and suggests that the problem to be discussed is the sterile and invidious question of the exact function of the literary critic. The summary condemnation of large numbers of critics as addicted to the "intentional fallacy" or the "affective fallacy" cannot but be resented. Moreover, the volume does not carry out a sustained attack on these schools (the romantic is, for example, given an honorable and most sympathetic treatment in "The Structure of Romantic Nature Imagery"). And Mr. Wimsatt's principles are really broad enough to accommodate the best in either school, leaving those critics who are interested *only* in the personal affairs of the man who happens to be a poet (intentional fallacy) and those critics who are interested *only* in the *frisson* that results from poetry (affective fallacy) to find their errors in the synthesis of poet, poem, and audience which Mr. Wimsatt embraces.

Perhaps it will not be facetious to say the *The Verbal Icon* is a fair title for this book from another angle. Mr. Wimsatt's style is everywhere difficult and often the difficulty comes from a proclivity to say things like "the verbal icon" when "word" would do as well. A certain density and gnomic flavor seem to be deliberately cultivated. Fowler's "elegant variation," upon which Mr. Wimsatt has such an illuminating essay, did not die with the nineteenth century. Rather, under the aegis of science—and semanticism—it shelters a snobbery of expression which is peculiarly that of our modern highpriesthood of "the learned." Mr. Wimsatt is a man very far removed from such snobbery, and his involved style is to be regretted chiefly because it will hinder wider acceptance of a critic with a very great work to do in American criticism.

*Anthologie philosophique de Antonio Rosmini.* **Introd. By Régis Jolivet. Paris: E. Vitte, 1954. Pp. 309. Paper, 2400 fr.**

This anthology is a particularly useful one. The texts have been grouped systematically, those pertaining to the theory of knowledge (pp. 107-90), psychology and anthropology (pp. 195-299), and theosophy (pp. 303-68) by G. Rossi, and morality (pp. 369-499) by M. F. Sciacca.

The introduction by Régis Jolivet (pp. 7-53) first examines the notion of philosophical system as held by Rosmini, then considers its relations to tradition; after that he examines the idea of being, the ideal, the existence of God; then he compares Rosmini to Aquinas and Kant. There is also a biographical notice (pp. 54-74) by Giovanni Pusineri, and bibliographical notes (pp. 75-89) by Dante Morando. Translations from the Italian are due to Dom Lucien David and Dom Lucien Chambat.

*Aristotle in the West.* **By Fernand Van Steenberghen. Trans. by Leonard Johnston. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955. Pp. 244. 100 fr. b.**

This work is a translation of *Aristote en Occident* (1946) brought up to date by the author himself in the light of recent publications (as late as 1954) and completed by three chapters, one on the origins of Aristotelianism at Oxford, a second on the career of Siger of Brabant, and a third on the condemnations of 1277.

The main theses of the author are the following. Prior to St. Thomas and particularly to the condemnations of 1277 there did not exist distinctively different philosophical schools. More exactly, the distinction between Augustinianism and Aristotelianism in philosophy did not exist before that time. The earlier movement should be called "eclectic Aristotelianism," which has a more or less strongly Platonic and even neo-Platonic color. There is no Latin Averroism but only a "heterodox Aristotelianism." Prior to St. Albert the Great, there was no "scientific philosophy" among Western Christians but only a theology making use of isolated philosophical propositions. In this sense, the author claims that De Wulf's view of a "common Scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages" is more adequate than the views of those who have opposed him, notably M. Gilson and Father Mandonnet.

No doubt, many of the author's views are well grounded. His view, for example, that there are no Latins who depended exclusively on Averroes is correct. Likewise, his view of the gradual emergence of philosophy as a distinct discipline has much to commend it. And many of his detailed historical investigations constitute definitive achievements.

Nevertheless, not all the theses can be considered as established. St. Bonaventure's view of "nature" is non-Aristotelian and Augustinian in a nontheological sense; St. Albert the Great's view of the union of soul and body is Dionysian in a similarly nontheological sense. Further detailed investigations on these and similar points will have to be made before the final word is spoken on the interpretation of medieval philosophy.

***Le "Credo" de Jean Rostand. Réponses et critiques.*** **By Ernest Huant. Tournai: Desclée et cie., 1955. Pp. 102. Paper.**

M. Jean Rostand issued a "Credo" which was a short summary of the modern naturalist's agnosticism and relativism, with a strong coloring of biological views. The author of this reply is himself a biologist. He considers briefly the sort of "actualism" which Rostand held, then takes up a series of points of biologically orientated materialism: sensism, evolution, denial or finality, ontogenesis, the origin of life. Then he considers the relation between thought and awareness, liberty and immortality, and the thought of life as an adventure.

***De Ente et Essentia.*** **By Saint Thomas Aquinas. Ed. in Latin and Japanese by Vincentio M. Pouliot, O.P., and Akio Kusaka. Kyoto: Institutum Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, 1955. Pp. 101.**

Carefully translated and annotated texts and translations are a basic necessity for the development of an indigenous school of philosophy, and the young Institute of St. Thomas is to be congratulated in beginning what must be in its case a work of more than ordinary difficulty.

There is an excellent brief introduction (pp. x-xvi) in French by Father Pouliot, drawing on the resources of the best scholarship.

***Du Mythe à la religion.*** **By Raymond Hostie. "Etudes Carmélitaines." Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955. Pp. 232. Paper, 120 fr. b.**

This study of the psychology of C. G. Jung by a prominent theologian has previously appeared in Dutch. In the first part, the author presents the work of Jung historically and textually on the basic method of analytical psychology, the basic ideas of that psychology (libido, imago and symbol, the archetypes, individuation), and the effort of synthesis or rather compromise. In the second part, he continues the exposition but joins it to a criticism of Jung's psychology of religion, the relation between psychotherapy and spiritual direction, and psychology and dogma.

As far as this work goes, it is the most balanced and delicately nuanced study of Jung yet written by a Catholic—it avoids both the exaggerated praise of some and the intemperate attacks of others. Yet there is still a basic defect. The author recognizes that Jung himself lacks a clear idea of the nature of metaphysical and

religious knowledge; it must be added that the author does not have an altogether adequate idea of the nature of scientific knowledge.

***Geschichte der Philosophie. III and IV: Die griechische Philosophie,*** **dritter and vierter Teil. By Wilhelm Capelle. "Sammlung Göschen, Bände 859, 863." Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1954. Vol. III, pp. 128; Vol. IV, pp. 131. Paper, each DM 2.40.**

These two volumes complete the history of Greek philosophy by W. Capelle. Volume III covers the period from the death of Plato to the old Stoicism; Volume IV, from old Stoicism to the first century B.C. Though brief, these two volumes are remarkable for completeness and accuracy.

***Gnosis und spätantiker Geist.*** **Teil I: Die mythologische Gnosis; Teil II, 1: Von der Mythologie zur mystischen Philosophie. By Hans Jonas. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 375. Vol. II, I, pp. xv + 223. Paper, DM 28; DM 18.**

Vol. I of this work appeared in 1934 and the present edition is a corrected reprint. Vol. II, 1, appears for the first time and is intended to be completed by a second part which will also contain the indices to both volumes.

The author tells us that his method and interest in this work are philosophical but that the matter pertains rather to history and historical theology. Indeed, even in the "philosophical" method there is more of a kind of theologizing than of philosophy—the author follows his former teacher, Bultmann, rather closely. Hence, the proper evaluation of this work, when it shall be completed, is to be expected from a philosophical theologian.

***Grace and Original Justice according to St. Thomas.*** **By William A. Van Roo, S.J. "Analecta Gregoriana, vol. LXXV." Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1955. Pp. 211. Paper.**

Though this is explicitly a theological thesis, there are a number of sections with very significant philosophical import. In part three, the author deals with formal and efficient causality (pp. 155-64) and with charity as the form of the virtues (pp. 165-74). In this study of St. Thomas's doctrine on powers, habits, and acts, and their various causal interrelations, the author has done a much more complete and adequate job than any previous investigation.

***Grande Antologia Filosofica.*** **Directed by Umberto Antonio Padovani, with the help of Andrea Mario Moschetti. Milan: Marzorati, 1954 ff. Vol. I, pp. lxxi + 803; Vol. II, pp. xiv + 926; Vol. III, pp. lxix + 619; Vol. IV, pp. xiv + 621-1753; Vol. V, pp. xiv + 1329.**

The plan of this ambitious series includes fifteen volumes, divided into eight parts. The last volume is to be an index of names and doctrines.

Each part is preceded by a general introductory study and bibliography devoted to the period as a whole; within each part, there are similar introductions to the major philosophers or to movements. Then come fairly extensive readings in Italian translation. When selections are made from major writings, the selections are joined by brief summaries so that the reader can obtain a general view of the whole work as well as a particular knowledge of the given texts.

The first two volumes make up Part I, classical thought. The general introduction to Greek thought is by U. A. Padovani and the general bibliography by A. M. Moschetti. The other authors and their subjects are as follows: Emilio Bodrero and A. M. Moschetti, the pre-Sophists (introd., 1-38; text, 39-83); Mario Untersteiner, the Sophists (introd., 85-106; texts, 107-39); Giovanni M. Bertin, Socrates and the minor Socratic schools (introd., 141-74; texts, 175-221); Luigi Stefanini, Plato (introd., 223-37; texts, 238-321, with some editorial matter interspersed); Carlo Giacon, S.J., Aristotle (introd., 323-47; texts, 348-436); Marino Gentile, Stoicism (introd., 437-52; texts, 453-81); Enzo Paci, Epicureanism (introd., 483-95; texts, 496-508); Mario del Pra, Greek skepticism (introd., 509-30; texts, 531-72); Felice Battaglia, Roman philosophy (introd., 573-86; texts, 587-654); Giuseppe Faggin, Neoplatonism and its precursors (introd., 655-86; particular introds. and texts, 687-803).

In the second volume, Gaetano C. Braga has done a study on religion in classical thought (introd., 5-45; texts, 46-143); Carlo Mazzantini, aesthetics in pre-Christian times (introd., 145-49; particular introds. and texts, 149-243; conclusion, 244-46); Carlo Diano, the concept of the history of philosophy in the Greeks (introd., 247-351; texts, 352-404); Francesco Albèrgamo, science in antiquity (introd., 405-26; texts, 427-75); Giuseppe F. D'Arcais, education in classical thought (introd., 477-81; particular introds. and texts, 482-607); Bruno Brunelli, political and juridical thought in Hellenism (introd., 609-42; texts, 643-724); Biondo Biondi, political and juridical thought in Rome (introd., 725-57; texts, 758-822); Gino Barbieri, economics in antiquity (introd., 823-26; particular introds. and texts, 827-926).

Parts II (Vols. III-V) has a general introduction to Christian thought by U. A. Padovani (III, xiii-xx) and a general bibliography by A. M. Moschetti (xxi-lxix). Volume III continues thus: Paolo Dezza, S.J., the philosophy of Christianity (introd., 1-12; texts, 13-95); Emanuele Rapisarda, early Patristic thought (introd., 97-104; particular introds. and texts, 104-81); Agostino Faggiotto, major early heresies (introd., 183-97; particular introds. and texts, 198-251); Michele F. Sciacca, St. Augustine (introd., 253-78; texts, 279-357); Maria T. Antonelli, post-Augustinian Patristic thought (introd., 359-406; texts, 407-48); Roberto Paribeni and Antonio Quacqarelli, pagan-Christian controversies (introds., 449-59, 533-43; texts, 460-532, 544-619).

Volume IV continues the material of Volume III and so is appropriately continuously paginated. Sofia Vanni Rovighi has written on early Scholasticism, from the ninth to the twelfth centuries (introd., 621-32; particular introds. and texts, 633-821); Renato Lazzarini, St. Bonaventure (introd., 823-48; texts, 849-82);

Gugliolmo C. Ulloa, St. Thomas Aquinas (introd., 883-914; texts, 915-1046); Goffredo Quadri, medieval Arabic and Hebrew philosophy (introd., 1047-54; particular introds. and texts, 1055-1147); Bruno Nardi, Dante (introd. and texts, 1049-1251; biblio., 1052-54); Carlo Balic, O.F.M., and Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M., post-Thomistic Scholasticism (introd., 1055-1266; particular introds. and texts, 1267-1476); Giulio Bonafede, medieval mysticism (introd., 1477-91; texts, 1492-1598); Ilarino da Milano, medieval heresies (introd., 1599-1624; texts, 1625-89); Mario Petroncelli, the great monastic rules (introd., 1691-1715; texts, 1716-53).

Volume V contains studies whose authors and subjects are as follows: Giovanni Di Napoli, the relation between philosophy and theology (introd., 1-70; texts, 71-149); Rocco Montano, aesthetics (introd., 150-205; texts, 207-310); Cornelio Fabro, the philosophy of history (introd., 311-66; texts, 367-503); Giovanni Di Napoli, medieval science (introd., 505-32; texts, 533-87); Giuseppe F. D'Arcais, educational theory (introd., 589-94; particular introds. and texts, 595-711); Paolo Brezzi, christian political theory (introd., 713-25, 797-802; particular introds. and texts, 726-96, 803-921); Goffredo Quadri, juridical philosophy (introd., 924-32; particular introds. and texts, 933-1088); Gino Barbieri, Christian economic theory (introd., 1089-99; particular introds. and texts, 1100-1329).

***In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio.*** **By St. Thomas Aquinas. Ed. by Raymund M. Spiazzi, O.P. Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1955. Pp. xviii + 439. Paper.**

This edition contains the Leonine text, without the critical apparatus. The present editor has kept the Leonine subdivisions and numberings, as well as adding the continuous numbering of the paragraphs. He has also added synopses of each *lectio* and given some explanatory footnotes and references to other works of St. Thomas.

The introduction of the editor briefly shows the relation of the logical commentaries to the other works, gives the chronology and similar information, and presents a brief summary of the doctrine contained in them.

***In Librum de Causis Expositio.*** **By St. Thomas Aquinas. Ed. by Ceslaus Pera, O.P.; historical introduction by Pietro Caramello and doctrinal introduction by Carolo Mazzantini. Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1955. Pp. lviii + 173. Paper.**

The text of the *Liber de Causis,* as the editor notes (p. liii), is the one commonly used in the editions of St. Thomas but with the corrections proposed by Robert Steele in his edition of Roger Bacon. The text of St. Thomas's *Commentary* is the same, with attention paid to the article of C. Vansteenkiste (*Etudes et Recherches,* cahier VIII [1952], 171-91) and with the inclusion in the notes of some readings "alicuius momenti" from the edition of H.-D. Saffrey, O.P. (Fribourg, 1954).

The introductions will be very helpful to beginning students and are of great help in the indication of sources for further study of the origins, meaning, and value of the *Liber* itself.

***In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio.*** **By St. Thomas Aquinas. Ed. by P. M. Maggiolo, O.P. Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1954. Pp. xi + 663. Paper.**

This edition contains the Leonine text of both the text of Aristotle and of St. Thomas. The Leonine subdivisions of the *lectiones* are given in brackets, and there is also a continuous numeration of the paragraphs. A synoptic outline is given before each *lectio*, and the Leonine summaries are given at the end of the commentary. There is a short, useful introduction.

***L'Intentionnel selon saint Thomas.*** **By André Hayen, S.J., with a preface by Joseph Maréchal, S.J. 2d ed.; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954. Pp. 286. Paper, 195 fr. b.**

This second edition differs in some important details from the first, though the author tells us that there are only modifications of detail. In the foreword to the second edition, he replies to some critical reviews, especially those of L. B. Geiger, O.P., J. H. Nicolas, O.P., and J. Cottiaux; he informs us that to do justice to his present views he would have to write another book (which he also promises to do). Some of the major changes concern analogy, the intentionality of the medium, and the use of some Thomistic terms pertaining to intellect. In fact, through modifications of detail, the new foreword, and added footnotes and references, the book meets many of the criticisms levied against it.

The present study of analogy is especially important, with its careful examination of the standard explanations of proportionality, and its restoring of the notion of participation.

The new edition has the added convenience of including in brackets the pagination of the first edition.

***Introduccion a la Filosofia.*** **By Manuel Gonzalo Casas. Argentina: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, 1954. Pp. 356. Paper.**

This textbook is intended to be used for a course in the introduction to philosophy. It begins with a history of the meanings of the term *philosophy*. Then it examines the origin of knowledge, the relation between philosophy and common sense, science, and theology. Then come the themes of philosophy: knowledge, culture, realism, with a word on St. Thomas. Abstraction and conceptualization come in for discussion. Then follow chapters on the branches of philosophy, then a series of chapters on modern existentialists and phenomenologists. The last chapter is a bio-bibliography of all the important philosophers of Argentina. Finally, there is a bibliography of Spanish works and periodicals.

The book is too elaborate and presupposes too much technical knowledge for a beginning course and is too wordy for an advanced reader.

### *Kant und die Scholastik heute.* Ed. by Johannes B. Lotz, S.J. "Pullacher philosophische Forschunge, Band I." Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1955. Pp. viii + 279. Paper, DM 16.

This volume is an auspicious beginning for a new series of philosophical studies; it exemplifies well the high standards and the living spirit which the editors plan for the future volumes.

The five essays in this volume are (1) on Kantian and Thomistic theories of knowledge, by Joseph De Vries, S.J.; (2) on the transcendental method in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and in Scholasticism, by Johannes B. Lotz, S.J.; (3) on the unconditioned in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* by Walter Brugger, S.J.; (4) on formalism and material ends in Kant's ethics, by Josef Schmuker; and (5) on Heidegger and Kant, by Emerich Coreth, S.J. There is also a very useful classified bibliography of Scholastic (and Christian) philosophical writings on Kant since 1920, by Walter Brugger, S.J. (pp. 256-79).

The first four essays, despite their diversity of subjects, have a common aim and structure: to point out similarities between Kantian doctrines and methods and those of Scholasticism, to criticize where need be, and to look on historical Scholasticism and Kantianism as in some sense complementary and capable of being assumed into a more inclusive synthesis, that of neo-Scholasticism. This effort by no means implies an eclecticism.

The essay by Father Coreth has to some extent the same ultimate purpose but is directly concerned with Heidegger's point of departure and his effort to surpass Kant from Kantian starting points. Father Coreth, after a detailed analysis, makes an attempt to evaluate Heidegger's success, and in the course of this evaluation casts some serious doubt upon the possibility of successfully establishing metaphysics by any kind of subjective a priori.

### *Isokrates.* By Eino Mikkola. Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, 1954. Pp. 347. Paper.

This study of the thought of Isocrates consists of two parts. In the first, the author considers the orator's views on reality and concludes that he holds that truth is inaccessible to man and that we must be content with probability; hence men must abandon metaphysics and theology as well as any absolute ethical standards. He replaces speculative certainty with practical conservatism. In the second part, the author examines the structure of experience and finds that social influences are of paramount importance, and among them are chiefly the factors of speech and eloquence.

There are a full bibliography and detailed indices.

*Kierkegaard et le Catholicisme.* By H. Roos, S.J. Trans. by André Renard, O.S.B. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955. Pp. 92. Paper, $.92.

The English translation of this work was noted and reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXII (1955), 381. The translator has changed the references to those of French translations where available and has added a few short explanatory footnotes.

*Kleinere Schriften.* By Nicolai Hartmann. Vol. 1: Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1955. Pp. 318. DM 26.

This is the first of three projected volumes containing the shorter writings of Hartmann; the second is to be devoted to those on the history of philosophy, the third, on systematic writings. In the present collection, all except two have previously been published; these are "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie" (pp. 122-79) and "Vom Wesen sittlicher Forderungen" (pp. 279-310).

In addition to the one ethical paper mentioned above, there is another on the ethos of personality. The remaining papers deal with ontology and philosophy of nature. The first may be of more than ordinary interest: it is a summary of his own ideas written for a volume of such presentations.

*Logica, Cui Praemittitur Introductio in Philosophiam.* By Joseph De Vries, S.J. Barcelona: Herder, 1952. Pp. x + 181. Paper.

The *Introduction to Philosophy* is brief (pp. 1-76) but contains much matter. The author builds it up systematically in terms of the object, method, divisions, and relations of philosophy. In addition to general bibliographies, there are also suggested readings for each section, most of them in French or German.

The *Logic* is based on the older work of C. Frick, S.J., though it has been considerably improved in arrangement, style, and examples.

*Logische Wirklichkeitsstruktur und personaler Seinsgrund.* By Ottokar Blaha. Vienna: Verlag Stiasny, 1955. Pp. 91. Paper, DM 4.5.

The author intends in this very compressed presentation to show the basic "structures" (in a phenomenological sense of the term) of reality and thereby to provide a means of understanding and ordering the diversity of philosophical positions. According to him, the three logical primitives out of which all reality is composed are "knowing as such," "willing as such," and "I-ness as such." He maintains that these are the three basic logical elements.

*Maréchal e Kant.* By Mario Casula, S.J. "Archivum Philosophicum Aloisianum, 8." Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1955. Pp. 124. Paper, 600 lire.

This study restricts itself mainly to the problematic of the a priori. In his first chapter, the author examines the various notions of "critique" general, metaphysical, and transcendental, and then compares the latter two. In his second chapter, he examines the problematic of the a priori in Maréchal, developing it mainly from Cahier V of the *Le Point de Départ.* In his third chapter, the author examines the Kantian treatment of the transcendent, the "Copernican revolution," and the handling of the concept. The final chapter compares the results of the preceding ones and evaluates Maréchal's work from that point of view. The author contends first that the way Maréchal has placed the problem is not historically necessary, exclusive, and complete. Kant, he maintains, did not intend to "justify" metaphysical assertions but rather to remove God, the soul, and liberty, from the disputes of the philosophers. Thirdly, he questions the alleged "neutrality" of transcendental analysis, the equivalent place accorded to reflection and deduction, and the "neutrality" of the phenomenon. He concludes therefore that Maréchal has not really refuted Kant on Kantian grounds.

*Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in Onore di Bruno Nardi.* Ed. by Carlo Antoni. Firenze: Sansoni, 1955. 2 vols.; pp. 932. Paper, both vols., 8000 lire.

There are a number of studies here of philosophical importance; others are more concerned with purely literary problems. The following are the more significant ones: Mario d'Addio, on the six books of the *Republic* and fifteenth century Catholic thought in a letter of Minuccio Municci to Possevino; Mario Dal Pra, on the glosses on the categories in Ms. Paris lat. 13368; Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, on Avicenna and the Venetian doctors; Philippe Delhaye, on a moral florilegium; Ezio Franceschini, on Leonardo Bruni and the "Vetus Interpres" of the *Nicomachean Ethics;* Eugenio Garin, on the translations of Plato in the fifteenth century; Etienne Gilson, on the "coaequeva"; Paul Oskar Kristeller, on the *Quaestio de Felicitate* of Jacobus de Pistorio; Anneliese Maier, on Walter Burley as an "Averroist"; Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, on the *Monarchia*; Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, O.S.B., on Dante and Anselm of Canterbury in the Prologue of the *Divine Comedy*; Fernand van Steenberghen, on the proof of the existence of God from finality in the *De Veritate* of St. Thomas Aquinas; Sofia Vanni-Rovighi, on Albert the Great and the unity of substantial form in man; Gérard Verbeke, on William of Moerbeke and his method of translation; Bartholomaeus M. Xiberta, O.Carm., on Gerard of Bonona, O.Carm., and his question on the knowability of God.

There is also a bibliography of the writings of Bruno Nardi.

***Metaphysik des sittlich Guten.*** **By Caspar Nink, S.J. Freiburg: Herder, 1955. Pp. ix + 164.**

This investigation of the fundamental principles of ethics is directed to all serious students of ethics and theology. As the author says, the basic concepts of any scientific knowledge need more explanation and proof than any particular conclusions.

The author intends to investigate in this work the essence of moral goodness, its law, and its realization. In the first part, he studies the relation of moral goodness to being and the goodness of being, the norm of moral goodness (man as image of God), the a-priori principles of goodness and how we know them, conscience. In the second part, he studies moral law and its properties, including its immutability. In the third part, he asks how moral goodness is actualized and concludes that the basic virtue is love of God and that the moral virtues, especially the cardinal virtues, are concretizations of this love.

The author follows in this work the same method he followed in his *Ontologie*; namely, the method of the a-priori deduction of the principles which are presupposed. This is at best a very involved method; in addition, the author's style is highly complex.

***Paideia.*** **By Werner Jaeger. Vols. II and III. 2d ed.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1954, 1955. Vol. II, pp. 418, DM 14.80. Vol. III, pp. 462, DM 14.80.**

These two volumes first appeared in 1936 and have been out of print for a long time; the present edition is an unchanged reprint of the first edition. Vol. II is almost entirely devoted to Plato's ideas on "education" in Jaeger's sense; Vol. III continues the topic, with sections on Isocrates, Xenophon, and Demosthenes and related figures.

***Pantaleo Carabellese. La Conscience concrète.*** **By Giuseppe Bufo and Luigi Aurigemma. Paris: Aubier, 1955. Pp. 218. Paper.**

Carabellese was one of the Italian philosophers who were influential in changing the predominant interest of Italian philosophers from rationalistic idealism to personalism or spiritualism. He attempted to correct the criticism of Kant by the addition of the Cartesian starting-point (modified so that the ego or thought is also being).

The editors give a very sympathetic introduction (pp. 5-41). The rest of the work consists of translations from Carabellese's writings.

***The Personal Conquest of Truth according to J. H. Newman.*** **By A. J. Boekraad. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955. Pp. 327. Paper, $3.50.**

This is a study of Newman's teaching on how an individual arrives at truth,

especially moral and religious truth. After an introductory chapter on Newman and how he came to be interested in this problem, the author studies that problem in Newman's own experience. He then considers Newman's views on various opposed doctrines, especially that of liberalism. Then the problem is carefully stated in Newman's own terms, and the solution is given.

This study is noteworthy for two things. In the first place, the author carefully studies the text of Newman himself (making use of hitherto unpublished material) to determine the precise meaning of terms and phrases. This is particularly necessary in Newman, as is evident from the very special meanings for such frequently used terms as "moral certainty." In the second place, the author succeeds in comparing Newman's thought on knowledge, truth, certitude, principles, and the like, to the doctrine of St. Thomas without distorting either.

Father Boekraad makes such points as the distinction between "notional" and "real assent," "instinct," "inference," and its kinds (natural, informal, formal) intelligible to a reader trained in Thomistic philosophy and thereby also makes them acceptable. The only deficiency is that the Thomistic doctrine on the nature of the judgment of real existence and on the composite nature of our knowledge of sensible reality are not adequately understood. But for the rest, the book will be of the greatest interest. Any Thomistically trained philosopher who is interested in the theory of knowledge of Newman should read this book. So also should anyone who is interested in how metaphysics can be taught to young people, how conversions are accomplished, why there is metaphysical and religious diversity, what is wrong with rationalism.

**_Philosophia Moralis._ By Joannes B. Schuster, S.J. Barcelona: Herder, 1952. Pp. xv + 228. Paper.**

This textbook follows the classical work of V. Cathrein, S.J., in the matter chosen and in the general order of exposition; but many points which made the later editions of Cathrein unmanageable have been omitted. Some modern points have been added. The shortening of the material, however, seems to have been carried too far, as for instance in the chapter on the virtues, which is so brief as to consist almost entirely of abstract formulae.

The author bases his proof of the natural law on the Divine Wisdom, and concludes its absolute immutability from the same ground. He proves the malice of suicide from the divine dominion over creatures and that of lying from the social consequences. For the keeping of obligatory secrets he discusses only the theory of mental reservation (in the wide sense).

**_Philosophia Naturalis._ By Carl Frank, S.J. 2d ed.; Freiburg: Herder, 1949. Pp. xii + 220. Paper.**

This textbook of natural philosophy takes as the matter of its investigation the scientific view of the world, or the total scientific description of nature. It can do

this because it supposes that the distinction between philosophy and science is the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes.

The author holds that "primary matter" has both an entitative and an existential act and that it is very hard to prove that there are any individuals in the sub-organic world. He admits a mitigated evolution, to the exclusion of any transformation of species.

### *Philosophische Anthropologie.* By Michael Landmann. "Sammlung Göschen." Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1955. Pp. 266. Paper, DM 4.80.

More accurately, this book would be called "theories of anthropology." True, the author says that one of the tasks of his anthropology (as distinguished from scientific and cultural anthropology) is to investigate what man is. But his method of investigation is itself anthropological.

The introductory chapter tries to place the problem as indicated above and to give a brief history of the development of anthropologies. The first part is a religious anthropology, beginning with a brief study of the anthropology of the Old and New Testaments and then considering five disputed points of this anthropology: theocentrism, anthropocentrism, the doctrines of original sin, grace, and immortality. The second part is the anthropology of reason, considering various attitudes toward reason: glorification, rejection, the various tasks of reason. The third part is biological anthropology, considering the various opinions about man in relation to animals, the theory of evolution, some human characteristics. The fourth part is cultural anthropology, treating man both as creator and creation of culture.

This is a useful summary but with some peculiar lacunae. For example, the Aristotelian theory of matter and form is understood in a very superficial way; "abstraction" in metaphysics consists in considering the forms of sensible things without their matters and is the same kind of intellectual operation as the phenomenological suspension of judgment.

### *Psychologia Metaphysica.* By Alexander Willwoll, S.J. Barcelona: Herder, 1952. Pp. ix + 198. Paper.

This textbook by the well-known professor at Pullach and Rome is in the same line of development as that of Father Joseph Fröbes, S.J., though it is somewhat more philosophical and less empirical. There is the same tendency to consider systematic questions as unimportant and doubtful (for instance, distinction between soul and faculties, union of soul with primary or second matter, distinctions of the internal senses). There is also the implied thesis that the singular is known directly and immediately by the intellect.

There are lists of objections to each thesis; no bibliographies or suggested readings are given.

*Il Realismo Integrale di M. Blondel.* By Romeo Crippa. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1954. Pp. 202. Paper, 1500 lire.

This sympathetically inclined study takes up the dynamism of action, metaphysical realism, the real origin of thought, the essential Christianity of philosophy, and the substantial bond of being. The author stresses the relation between Blondel and Ollé-Laprune and the "realistic spiritualism" of Blondel's thought.

*El Realismo Intuitivo.* By Benjamin Aybar. Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, 1954. Pp. 99. Paper.

In this short work, the author tries to establish that there is an intellectual intuition of the soul itself, that this is the doctrine of St. Thomas, and that with the addition of this kind of knowledge one can satisfy the exigencies of many modern philosophies, as well as provide a sound foundation for metaphysics and theory of knowledge.

*Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin.* By Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, O.E.S.A. Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1954. Pp. xiii + 189. Paper, 10.40 fr. swiss.

Though almost anything St. Augustine wrote is of philosophical interest, the general direction of these investigations is almost purely theological. There is some philosophical relevance in the investigations into the union of soul and body (pp. 30-32), the terminology of the union of the two natures in Christ (pp. 41-44), the terminology of nature itself (pp. 45-47), the terminology of the affections in man (pp. 119-22), and the various meanings of "ignorance" (pp. 154-57).

*Le Sens de la création.* By Nicolas Berdiaev. Trans. by Lucienne Julien Cain; preface by Stanislas Fumet. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955. Pp. 467. Paper, 150 fr. b.

Written in 1914, this book was said by Berdiaev to have been the fruit of a single inspiration and to be one of his most representative books. It already contains all the themes he was later to expand; it provides clear evidence of the results to be expected from an identification of philosophy and theology.

There is a short introduction by the translator (pp. 9-12), and a lengthy, evaluative preface by Stanislas Fumet (pp. 13-29), which offers some valuable theological judgments upon Berdiaev's work.

*A Short History of Philosophy.* By F. J. Thonnard, A.A. Trans. by Edward A. Maziarz, C. PP. S. Tournai: Desclée & Cie, 1955. Pp. x + 1074. $6.50.

This translation is made from the edition of 1948, with some change in the

bibliographies, consisting in the omission of some references, the addition of English works, and the substitution of references to translations rather than original foreign-language works. The translation is an excellent piece of work.

It is not possible to judge the merits of this history without describing a point of view. Granted that an author takes the history of philosophy seriously and at the same time philosophically, there are still two ways in which he can write that history. If he thinks of philosophy as primarily a habit of the intellect, he will be basically concerned with presenting the reasoning and making the reader appreciate it as such, and secondarily and consequently with the adequacy of the premises and the truth of the conclusions. If, on the other hand, he thinks of philosophy as primarily a "body of doctrine," he will be concerned with presenting that doctrine objectively and judging it at once as either true or false. Father Thonnard is concerned to be fair (is it possible, however, to present Kant fairly in Thomistic terms? Cf. p. 655); and he is concerned equally with evaluating, again fairly, the truth or error of each point. Teachers who wish to use this book should realize its character.

***Sociologie et pluralisme dialectique. Introduction à l'oeuvre de Georges Gurvitch.*** **By René Toulemont. Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1955. Pp. 276. Paper, $2.40.**

This study of the work of Gurvitch takes into account all of his writing. The first chapter deals with his earlier philosophical works, which were in the beginning strongly influenced by Fichte. Then the author begins the study of method. This is followed by chapters on the content of various sociological investigations, morality, jurisprudence, the multiplicity of societies, the law, knowledge, religion. Then come two more general chapters, on pluralistic democracy and on constancy and variation in sociological facts. The last chapter criticizes some of the more questionable theories of Gurvitch, those on philosophy, psychology, method, morality, law, and the nature of sociology itself. There are a selected bibliography and a table of contents, but no index.

***Studi Filosofici Intorno all' "Esistenza," al Mondo, al Trascendente.*** **"Analecta Gregoriana, Vol. LXVII." Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. viii + 351. Paper.**

This volume contains the papers read at the philosophical section of the international congress in honor of the fourth centenary of the Gregorian University, October 14-16, 1953. The papers are divided into three parts, as the title indicates. In the first part, Heidegger was treated in papers by N. Picard, O.F.M., C. Fabro, C.P.S., A. Naber, S.J., and E. Coreth, S.J. Abbagnano was discussed by G. Giannini. More general existentialist themes were written on by G. Ducoin, S.J., A. de Vos, O.P., J. B. Lotz, S.J., S. Gomez Nogalés, S.J., M. Reding, and A. Marc, S.J.

In the second part, cosmology was the subject of papers by B. Thum, O.S.B.,

G. Isaye, S.J., F. Selvaggi, S.J., and P. Hoemen, S.J.; methods and conclusions of science were discussed by R. Masi, M. Viganó, S.J., H. André, and J. Abelé, S.J.

The third part contains papers on the proof of the existence of God by Msgr. L. De Raeymaeker, J. Defevre, S.J., W. Brugger, S.J., C. Giacon, S.J., B. Welte, L. Bogliolo, S.D.B., and R. Arnou, S.J.; and also two historical studies, that of J. Owens, C.SS.R. on Scotus and A. a Krizovljan, O.F.M. CAP., on Olivi.

***Sujecion y Libertad del Pensamiento Catolico.*** **By Albert Hartmann, S.J. Barcelona: Herder, 1955. Pp. 298. Paper.**

This is a translation of a collection of essays which appeared in German under the title *Bindung und Freiheit des Katholischen Denkens* (1952) and which used the encyclical *Humani Generis* as a point of departure. Essays of particular interest are those on Christian philosophy by Albert Hartmann, S.J.; existentialism by Joannes B. Lotz, S.J.; the knowledge and proof of the existence of God by Joseph de Vries, S.J.; and the first essay on the evolution of man, by Paul Overhage, S.J.

***Theodor Litt.*** **By Paul Vogel. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1955. Pp. 54. Paper, DM 4.80.**

The subject of this biographical memoir, who completed his seventy-fifth year of life in December, 1955, is one of the most prominent philosophers and educators of Germany. The memoir gives a very brief account of his life, of his philosophical position (a broad view of man according to principles derived party from Hegel, partly from Husserl), his educational theories, and a list of his writings.

***Tres Classes de Introduccion a la Filosofia de la Naturaleza.*** **By Olsen A. Ghirardi. Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, n.d. Pp. 56. Paper.**

These three lectures serve as an introduction to the philosophy of nature. In the first, the author distinguishes the philosophy of nature from modern natural science, following the lead of M. Maritain, and treats also the mixed sciences and beings of reason. In the second lecture, the author distinguishes three kinds of biology: the concrete, the theoretical, and the philosophical. In the third, the author further analyzes the relation between philosophy and natural science, and also examines the relation between metaphysics and the philosophy of nature.

***La Trinité: I: Le Mystère.*** **By St. Augustine. Introd. by E. Hendrikx, O.E.S.A. Trans. and notes by M. Mellett, O.P., and Th. Camelot, O.P. "Oeuvres de saint Augustin, Vol. XV." Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955. Pp. 613.**

This volume contains Books I to VII, with the Latin text of the Benedictine

edition as given by Migne and a facing French translation of high quality.

The introduction is to the work as a whole. In the first part, Father Hendrikx gives the history of the work, its purpose, and its success. In the second part, he gives a long analysis of the content, divided into two main parts: the dogma and its analogies in creation. By and large, this is a very useful summary; one could quarrel with the author's notion of Scholastic theology and his corresponding idea of Augustine's "rationalism." In the third part, a brief history of editions and translations is given. There is a selected bibliography (pp. 77-83). The notes to the introduction and text are relatively brief (pp. 557-91); there is a good analytic index (pp. 593-606).

***La Valeur dans l'histoire.*** **By Felice Battaglia. Trans. by M.-L. Roure. Preface by Régis Jolivet. Paris: Aubier, 1955. Pp. 206. Paper, 525 fr.**

Battaglia was one of Gentile's pupils, and like so many other Italian thinkers has come to a kind of Christian spiritualism. The present work touches one of the themes which he has often written about. In it, he begins with a general statement of the problem of history. Then in two succeeding chapters he studies the concept of history according to Groce and Gentile. In the final chapter, he shows that history cannot be understood or estimated properly except in admitting the existence of a transcendent value which is God.

***Vitesse et univers relativiste.*** **By Jean Abelé, S.J., and Pierre Malvaux, S.J. Preface by Henri Villat; final note by O. Costa de Beauregard. Paris: Société d'Edition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1954. Pp. 238. Paper.**

The main portion of this book is due to Father Abelé. He begins by establishing the notion of qualitative greatness (size) and that velocity is such a qualitative greatness. He then shows the intimate link between this latter proposition and the theory of special relativity. In succeeding chapters he studies the relationships of differing velocities, the upper limit of velocity, the relativity of velocities, and their composition. He shows how velocity mediates between space and time, and relates this to the establishment of the equations of Lorentz. He then relates the composition of velocities to acceleration, and acceleration to relativity dynamics.

Father Malvaux has contributed three mathematical notes (pp. 145-72), on the isomorphism between the composition of velocities and groups of real numbers, on the limit of velocity and the law of composition, and on invariants. This section is followed by a glossary and commentary of relativity terms and expressions, in which both Father Abelé and Father Malvaux have a share.

This attempt to establish the theory of special relativity on a basis of intuitive experience is in very many respects an interesting and successful work. The author has a solid acquaintance with the scientific theories with which he deals,

and his reasoning is clear and well established. There remains a problem: The author has not investigated the precise ontological bearing of the scientific theories he discusses; he seems to assume that science is not only realistic but directly univocal with both immediate experience and philosophical conclusions.

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